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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions applicable
to this case.

(ii)

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EMILIO ROSADO,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

vs.

:
Case NO. 930714-CA

UNITED STATES ELEVATOR CORP.,
a California Corporation,
Defendant/Respondent•

:
:

Priority No. 15

:

REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL ELEMENTS OF THE THREE-PART TEST FOR THE
SUFFICIENCY OF A RULE 56(f) MOTION MUST BE CONSIDERED
TOGETHER. EVEN IF ROSADO HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO CONDUCT
DISCOVERY, THE OTHER TWO ELEMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED
U.S. Elevator repeatedly asserts that Rosado had sufficient
time to conduct discovery before the Motion for Summary Judgment
was filed. Even accepting that proposition, however, U.S. Elevator
fails to recognize that all three elements of the test found in
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah App. 1990),
should be satisfied before a court can properly deny a Rule 56(f)
Motion for Continuance.
The first element of that test inquires whether the Motion to
Continue is interposed merely to justify a "fishing expedition" for
purely speculative facts after substantial discovery has been
conducted.

Rosado's discovery requests, attached to his original

Brief, were not merely a "fishing expedition" for extraneous,

irrelevant information.

The discovery requests were focused on the

cent

whether U.S. Elevator had properly

maintained and adjusted the elevator doors which closed on Rosadc i's
hand.

The interrogatories and document requests were directly tui
speculati ve"

irrelevant
substantial

issues.

Further, they were not propounded

discovery

had

ci Tt: d i ii 1 y noil HI I M S I

already

been

'.'•

"after"

conducted,

when. 1 tin-1 "lll'i i a I ("unit

iuhl i 01

significant discovery had already been done and that additional
discovery would be unlikely

yield material issues

City inquires whether the nonmoving party was afforded appropriate
responses to his discovery requests
open
portior

(j; ]::

As Rosado pointed

1 0 ai i ::i 11 1 ) , I I S

suppl.

the documents Rosado had requested prior 1

Judgment Hearing.

t ne Summary

These documents were supplied five days before

the Summary Judgment Hearing.

Two of those days

t weekend.

Further, when the documents were provided, the undersigned was in
the process of preparing for a four day jury trial scheduled to
start on the morning ^
virtually impossible for
send them

*-b*> Summary Judgment Hearing.

undersigned to analyze the documents,

expert

the expert incorporating

It was

appropriate affidavit from
. . analysis of

documents in the time

remaining before the Summary Judgment Hearing.
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Even with those

Judgment Hearing, tried to refer to the documents with little
success.

It was clear that the Trial Court was not interested in

hearing about the evidentiary implications raised in the documents
U.S. Elevator had supplied.
U.S.

Elevator

did

not

respond

interrogatories Rosado had propounded.

to

any

of

the

numerous

For U.S. Elevator to claim

that this was a "sufficient" response to Rosado's discovery is
absurd•
A fair reading of Sandy City and the other cases articulating
the three-part test for determining the sufficiency of a Rule 56(f)
Motion

indicates that

all three elements must

be considered

together.
U.S. Elevator cites three cases for the proposition that
Rosado had ample time to conduct discovery:

Sandy City v. Salt

Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1990); Callioux v. Progressive
Co. .

Ins.

745

P.2d

838

(Utah App.

1987);

Reeves

Pharmaceutical, Inc. , 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988).

v.

Geiav

Each case is

distinguishable.
Sandy City is easily distinguishable because Sandy City's
Motion

for

a

Continuance

was

discovery had been completed.

denied

only

after

substantial

Sandy City did not allege in its

Rule 56(f) Affidavit that it needed more time for discovery.
at 489-490.

Rosado did.

Id.

Moreover, the Court concluded that the

information Sandy City might have attempted to undercover pursuant
to additional discovery would have been inappropriate for the

3

Couri

consideration i i i any event:

,i

_ of the "fact" issues

gl it to discover were outside

scope of inquiry

appropriate

'he central issue in Sandy City

municipality's challenge

to the issuance of a conditional
'.

use

The Court held:

Many of these issues [which may have been
developed with further discovery] are actually
issues of law. The only issues of fact are
the projected cost of the project and whether
the proposed development was in compliance
with the county master plan and the county
ordinances.
As we have noted above, these
issues were discussed and evidence was
presented before the county commissions, which
entered written findings and decided them on
their merits.
Because their findings were
supported by evidence, we do not disturb them
on review
Id

at 49 C)

Sai idy City does not support U.S. Elevator's position.

Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co. , is c:l is I, i ngu ,i shall Jl e 1.100:1111:1 e.,
although the Court did grant Summary Judgment while
depo

pending

Judgment

-.

moving party's Motion for Summary

filed until two years after the t'ompLdinl w-fis

Furthermore, the central issue

Callioux was the alleged
a

froir

Callioux's automobile,

suspected arson,

scheduled

^j[aim resulting

insurance

company

nvestigation eventually led to a criminal
s attorney ii 1 the civil

action against Progressive had defended

l

-m. at the crimina"1 +-T-I*I.

ipparent that the attorney had been given ample opportunity
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Summary Judgment.

Further, Callioux failed to make his Rule 56(f)

Motion for Continuance properly. He delayed filing his Motion for
Continuance until 4:57 p.m. the Friday afternoon before the Monday
hearing on the Summary Judgment Motion.
Reeves

v.

distinguishable.

Geiay

Pharmaceutical.

Reeves

filed

a

Id. at 841.
Inc.,

product

malpractice action in February, 1984.

Supra.

is

also

liability/medical

Reeves propounded, and

received answers to, written discovery requests. The parties took
several critical depositions within eleven months of the filing of
the Complaint.

Reeves propounded additional written discovery

requests a year after the Complaint was filed. In April 1986, over
two years after the Complaint was filed, the defendants filed
Motions for Summary Judgment.

The Court upheld the Trial Court's

denial of Reeve's Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue.

Reeves is

distinguishable because the nonmoving party in that case had had
over two years to perform discovery and had, in fact, received
appropriate answers to two sets of written discovery requests. The
nonmoving

party had been able to take critical depositions.

Further, counsel for the nonmoving party did not "articulate what
type of additional discovery was needed or the time necessary to
complete it" in support of her Rule 56(f) request.

Id. at 639.

The Court should recall, as it considers the interplay of the
three factors mentioned in Sandy City, the salient principle which
it has repeatedly articulated
Motions.

in its holdings on Rule 56(f)

Such motions to continue should be liberally granted:

5

It is generally held the Rule 56(f) motions
should be granted liberally to provide
adequate opportunity for discovery, because
information gained during discovery may create
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.
Sandv

Citv v. Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d at 488

(citations

omitted). It is the exceptional case, where a lack of diligence is
acutely apparent on the part of the non-moving party and it is
unlikely that a request for additional discovery will be fruitful,
in which a 56(f) Motion should be denied.
Several cases support Rosado's claim that the Lower Court's
denial of his Rule 56(f) Motion was improper.
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984), the defendant in
a fraud claim moved for Summary Judgment within a few weeks of the
filing of plaintiffs1 Complaint.

The Lower Court granted the

motion even though the moving party had never responded to the
nonmoving party's written discovery requests.

The Supreme Court

reversed, holding that it was improper to deny the Rule 56(f)
Motion while discovery was pending.

See also Strand v. Associated

Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977)
(reversing a Summary Judgment because the nonmoving party had been
given insufficient opportunity to rebut affidavits is support of
the motion).
Several cases from other jurisdictions offer useful guidance
on the issue of when a Rule 56(f) Motion should be granted.
Ward

v. United

States, 471 F.2d

667, 670

(3rd

Cir.

In

1973),

construing an almost identical federal rule, the Court held that "a
6

motion for continuance of a motion for summary

judgment for

purposes of discovery should ordinarily be granted almost as a
matter of course."

Id. at 670.

In Kennedy v. Gray, 807 P.2d 670

(Kan. 1991), the Court noted that Summary Judgment should rarely be
granted as long as pretrial discovery remains incomplete.
674.

Id. at

In Kennedy, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed a Summary

Judgment in part because the nonmoving party had been deprived of
a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery before attempting to
resist the motion. As in the case at bar, the Summary Judgment was
reversed even though some of the nonmoving party's outstanding
discovery requests had not been propounded until after the Motion
for Summary Judgment had been filed.
In Carter v. Jerniqan, 227 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1975), an action
was brought by various citizen plaintiffs to enjoin the State
Commission for the Blind from converting commission funds for
personal use.

The Trial Court was openly skeptical

of the

plaintiffs' ability to establish a cognizable claim, and granted
Summary Judgment before the plaintiffs had been able to complete
their pretrial discovery.

In reversing the Summary Judgment, the

Iowa Supreme Court noted:
Defendant's
argument
[regarding
the
propriety of an injunction] begs the question.
How do we know whether an injunction is
appropriate until we know the facts? The very
purpose of the modern discovery rule allowing
prior discovery is to learn the facts so that
the
court
can
apply
the
appropriate
substantive rule of law.
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We thus hold that the Trial Court should
have overruled defendant's motion for summary
judgment and permitted plaintiffs to pursue
discovery.
Id. at 136.
In Raitport v. National Bureau of Standards, 385 F. Supp. 1221
(E.D. Pa. 1974), a private citizen sued the United States and the
National Bureau of Standards challenging the government's rejection
of his proposal to create a federally sponsored bank to provide
loans for technologically oriented small businesses.

Many of the

plaintiff's theories of recovery were, to say the least, novel.
The defendants presented competent evidence that they had several
rational,

sufficient

reasons

to reject

plaintiff's proposal.

Nevertheless, the District Court delayed ruling on the defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment because of the possibility, "however
remote," that further discovery would furnish some factual support
for plaintiff's claims.

Id. at 1226.

U.S. Elevator completely fails to raise, in its responsive
Brief, any suggestion that it would have been prejudiced by waiting
an additional thirty (30) days for a ruling on its Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Balanced against Rosado's very real interest in

proceeding to trial on the merits, or at least having the Summary
Judgment Motion resolved on substantive rather than procedural
grounds, U.S. Elevator's interest in bringing the litigation to a
conclusion one month sooner seems exceedingly weak.
In the majority of Utah cases in which Trial Courts have been
upheld in the exercise of their discretion to reject a Rule 56(f)
8

Motion for Continuance, significant, substantial discovery had
already been done or, in the alternative, it was abundantly clear
that additional discovery would serve no purpose. That is not the
case here.
POINT II
THE MAINTENANCE LOGS TO WHICH ROSADO
REFERRED DURING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING
DID RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
Rosado submits that the few documents U.S. Elevator was
willing to produce prior to the Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing
did raise a genuine issue of material fact.

(See pages 13 - 15 of

Rosado's original Brief.)
U.S. Elevator argues that this evidence was not properly
before the Court at the time of the Summary Judgment Hearing. Even
accepting that that proposition is true, whose fault was that?
U.S. Elevator makes it clear in its Brief that Rosado needed to
resist its Motion for Summary Judgment with expert testimony.
Could Rosado realistically have an expert review the documents
produced five days prior to the hearing and return them to Utah
with a signed affidavit?
—

U.S. Elevator tries to have it both ways

arguing that Rosado should have resisted the Motion for Summary

Judgment with an expert's affidavit and, at the same time, claiming
that Rosado presumably had enough time to get an expert to review
the documents and create an appropriate affidavit on such short
notice.

9

Rosado wishes to point out that it would have done little good
for his expert to examine the accident scene months after the
accident. Whatever improper adjustment in the elevator doors which
might have caused or contributed to Rosado's injuries was probably
repaired within a few weeks of Rosado's injury.
is

not

a

case

where

alternative

methods

This

of

discovery

were

realistically available to Rosado. The only reasonable way Rosado
could commence discovery against U.S. Elevator was to propound
written discovery requests like the ones Rosado used.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
A. Elevator Doors Do not Ordinarily Crush the Limbs of
Users Absent Some Negligence bv the Entity Responsible
for Adjusting and Maintaining the Door.
The first element of Res Ipsa Loquitur is a showing that the
accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily happen absent some
negligence.
all

U.S. Elevator admits that Rosado need not eliminate

possible

inferences

of

non-negligence,

but

must

merely

establish that the balance of probabilities is such as to favor a
finding of negligence, citing to Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719
(Utah 1985).

Rosado quite agrees.

As anyone who has used an

elevator knows, a moving door is supposed to reverse upon contact
with an outstretched hand. How can U.S. Elevator seriously contend
that the "balance of probabilities" weighs in favor of a finding of
non-negligence

given

the

extraordinary

accident happened?
10

manner

in which

this

U.S. Elevator claims, quite predictably, that Rosado will
eventually have to prove negligence in this case with expert
testimony.

Although Rosado does intend to employ the services of

an expert, any layman who has used an elevator will agree with the
proposition that closing elevator doors should not crush a user's
limb.
It is significant that U.S. Elevator does not suggest, in its
responsive Brief, any explanation for how the door injured Rosadofs
hand.
Other courts have applied the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in
very similar elevator cases. Although Rosado recognizes that some
courts have refused to apply the doctrine to elevator claims,
Rosado submits that the better-reasoned decisions do so. In Giles
v. City of New Haven. 619 A.2d 476 (Conn. App. 1993), attached as
Addendum "A", the plaintiff was injured when a "compensation chain"
on the subject elevator failed.

The plaintiff was unable to

present direct evidence of malfunction of the elevator, or of any
defect in the compensation chain, maintenance related or otherwise,
but instead relied upon the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in order
to require the submission of the defendant's negligence to the
jury.

Id. at 478.

In reversing a grant of Summary Judgment for

the owner of the subject building and a directed verdict for the
manufacturer of the elevator, the Connecticut Court of Appeals
agreed that the plaintiff's accident was such that it would not
have

occurred

unless

someone

was

11

negligent

—

despite

the

plaintiff's inability to present direct evidence of negligence.
Id. at 478.
B.
Rosado did not "Control'1 the Adjustment and
Maintenance of the Leading Edge Reverse Mechanism on the
Subject Door.
U.S. Elevator argues, with respect to the second prong of Res
Ipsa Loquitur which inquires into the nature of the defendant's
control over the injury-producing device, that Rosado "controlled"
the elevator or shared in its control so that the doctrine is
inapplicable.

U.S. Elevator misses the point —

Rosado used the

elevator. He did not maintain, control, or adjust the leading edge
reverse mechanism on the door which should have caused the door to
reverse when it came in contact with Rosadofs hand.
Subsequent to the Trial Court's dismissal of U.S. Elevator,
Rosado's deposition was taken by the manufacturer of the elevator
door.

Rosado's testimony concerning the operation of the door at

this time of his injury is quite significant:
Q: (by Mr. Fowler) My question is, do you
recall that your action of putting your hand
against the inside of the door caused the
runner or plastic leading edge to be depressed
against the door?
Mr. Nielson: Do you remember whether your
hand made contact with that?
The witness: I made contact with it, but,
see, the problem is if it made contact, then
why did the door keep going?
Q:
(by Mr. Fowler) When you say it made
contact with it, are you talking the door or
that pressure edge?
A:

I am saying when the door was closing.
12

Q:

Right•

A: You know, it's like, you know, when you
got your hands around that, doesn't it push
in?
Q: And your memory is that you put your
hands around it and pushed it in?
A:

Yah.

Q:

And it didn't respond by opening again?

A:

No.

Rosado Deposition pages 135 - 136.

Rosado did not "control" the

leading edge mechanism which he depressed in an attempt to get the
door to stop prior to his injury. He merely used it. This action
is not "control" in the sense that that word is employed for the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
The Court in Giles v. City of New Haven. Supra. declined to
force the plaintiff to show that the defendant had exclusive
control of the elevator before applying the doctrine:
[E]xclusive control is not required in order
to submit a case to the jury on the theory of
res ipsa loquitur.
Rather, the control
element requires a balancing test in which a
court must determine whether a rational basis
exists for concluding that it was more
probable than not that the plaintiff's
injuries were attributable to the defendant's
negligence.
Id. at 481.
Also relevant to the control issue is the case of Ferguson v.
Westincrhouse Electric Corp., 408 S.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1981) (Holding
that an elevator is "uniquely under the control and maintenance" of
the manufacturer and maintenance company and that the Doctrine of

Res Ipsa Loquitur is particularly applicable in elevator cab
cases); see also Coleman v. Otis Elevator Co,, 582 So.2d 341 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1991).
In Swann v. Prudential Ins., 628 A.2d 989 (Md. App. 1993),
attached as Addendum "B", the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that
a Trial Court "[M]ust instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur if it
believes the jury, after considering all the evidence, or making
rational inferences therefrom, could reasonably find that the
plaintiff proved each element by a preponderance of the evidence."
Id. at 1001.

The Swann Court applied the Doctrine of Res Ipsa

Loquitur to plaintiff's elevator-injury claim.

The discussion in

Swann concerning Res Ipsa Loquitur is exhaustively researched. The
Court noted the following with respect to the "exclusive control"
element of Res Ipsa Loquitur:
The majority of states considering the
exclusive control issue under facts similar to
those sub iudice have concluded that an
elevator maintenance company is in exclusive
control of an elevator it services.
Id. at 1007.
Citing an earlier New York case, the Swann Court stated:
*Exclusivity1 is a relative term, not an
absolute.
*The logical basis for [the
control] requirement is simply that it must
appear that the negligence of which the thing
speaks is probably that of the defendant and
not of another.'
Id. at 1007.
By analogy, suppose a customer enters a lawn mower shop.

He

starts one of the display models. While the engine is idling, the
14

blade

flies

off

and

severely

injures

the

customer's

foot.

Although, in a technical sense, it is true that the customer
"controlled" the lawn mower at the time of his injury, the Doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur would be fully applicable.
C.
Rosado did not Contribute to his Injuries by
Attempting to Depress the Leading Edge Rather than
Withdrawing from all Contact with the Closing Elevator
Door.
U.S. Elevator argues that Rosado "obviously" contributed to
his own injuries by trying to stop the elevator door open rather
than simply retreating from such a vicious instrumentality.

It is

doubtful whether any member of this Court has not, within the last
ten days, attempted to hold an elevator door open by depressing the
doorfs leading edge.

Attached as an Addendum "C" to this Reply

Brief is a twelve page excerpt from Rosado's deposition wherein he
explains how the accident occurred. In essence, Rosado was injured
when he attempted to halt the progress of the closing elevator
door.

The door continued to close against his hand, pinning it

against the elevator wall. The door's leading edge was completely
unresponsive to Rosado's efforts.

Rosado had no notice that the

door would behave this way. He assumed, reasonably, that the door
would react just as all other elevator doors are supposed to react
—

by reversing upon contact with the leading edge.
In Giles, Supra. the Court stated that even if the plaintiff

had, in some way, contributed to her own injuries, that would not,
as a matter of law, prevent the application of Res Ipsa Loquitur:

15

With the adoption of the doctrine of
comparative negligence, a plaintiff can be a
participant in the events leading up to the
injury
suffered
without
depriving
the
plaintiff of the use of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur so long as the plaintiff was not
the sole cause of the injuries.
Id. at 480. Even if Rosado can be said to have contributed to his
own injuries by trying to stop a closing elevator door — something
a vast majority of elevator users do —

he was still entitled to

submit a claim under the theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Trial Court
granting U.S. Elevator's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
vacated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 1993.

DIUMENTI, LEWIS & HART

G. Eric Nielson
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, with attachments, to be
hand-delivered on the 1st day of December, 1993, to the following:
Tracy Fowler
Campbell Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Russell C. Fericks
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Key Bank Tower, 7th Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

A.

Giles v. Citv of New Haven. 619 A.2d 476 (Conn.
App. 1993).

B.

Swann v. Prudential Ins.. 620 A.2d 989 (Md. App. 1993).

C.

Pages 123 through 135 of Rosado's Deposition.
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Tab A

476

^ om ».

«19 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES
HI

The defendant further posits that the
jury instructions on the duty to retreat
relieved the state of its burden of proving
that the defendant knew that he could retreat with complete safety.10 At trial, the
defendant failed to object to the trial
court's instruction concerning self-defense.11 The defendant concedes that this
claim was not preserved before the trial
court, but seeks 1107this court's review under the doctrine of State v. Golding, supra.
The defendant asserts that a constitutional
violation clearly exists and clearly deprived
him of a fair trial. He also asserts that the
state cannot prove the harmlessness of the
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt. We are unpersuaded that Golding
review is warranted.
[101 When examining a trial court's instructions to a jury, we "do not engage in a
microscopic examination of the charge, dissecting it line by line, nor do we consider
the challenged portions of the charge in
isolation." State v. Andrews, supra, 29
Conn.App. at 540, 616 A.2d 1148; State v.
Wolff, 29 Conn.App. 524, 531, 616 A.2d
1143 (1992). We consider the instructions
as a whole to determine whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the jury was
misled by the charge. State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 498, 590 A.2d 901
(1991); State v. Andrews, supra. "Jury
instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect
or technically accurate
They must be
correct in law, adapted to the issues presented in the case and sufficient to guide
the jury in reaching a verdict." (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Wolff supra.
10. In charging the jury on the issue of selfdefense, the trial court instructed the jury that
the defendant "may justifiably use deadly force
if he reasonably believes that the other person is
using or about to use deadly physical force, or
secondly, the other person or persons was about
to inflict great bodily harm upon him. The law
does not encourage the use of deadly force and
in most circumstances a person must retreat
from the perceived harm about to be inflicted
upon him. However, here we have the testimony, and it is up to you to believe or not, as to
how the defendant, with the other witness, went

[111 Reviewing the charge as a whole,
we conclude that the trial court's instructions to the jury were accurate and sufficient to guide them in reaching their verdict. In its charge, the court discussed at
length the law regarding self-defense. It
informed the jury that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. The court
read verbatim the elements and justifications for the use of self-defense and deadly
force. See General Statutes §§ 53a-19,
53a-100. After correctly stating the law
concerning the duty to retreat,12 the court
added that lio8u[t]he defendant is not required to retreat if he is in his home or
dwelling." Because the defendant cannot
show that the trial court's charge on selfdefense clearly deprived him of a fair trial,
we will not review his claims. State v.
Golding, supra.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other Judges
concurred.
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I ^Louise GILES
v.
CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al.
No. 10952.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued Oct. 2, 1992.
Decided Jan. 26, 1993.
Elevator operator sued manufacturer
and building owner for personal injuries
into the kitchen. That is up to you to decide."
(Emphasis added.)
11. The state argues that the defendant not only
failed to object to the instruction concerning
self-defense, but, in fact, endorsed the instruction by stating, "I will tell the court I think the
court gave a very fair charge on justification
"
12. See footnote 10, supra.
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allegedly stemming from defective and
poorly inspected elevator. The Superior
Court, Judicial District of New Haven,
McKeever and DeMayo, JJ., granted summary judgment for owner and directed verdict on judgment of jury for manufacturer.
Operator appealed. The Appellate Court,
Dupont, C.J., held that: (1) elevator operator was entitled to have court submit res
ipsa loquitur theory to jury in operator's
action based on claim that elevator manufacturer or building owner was negligent,
and (2) manual control of elevator by operator did not negate any supposition that
building owner had exclusive control over
elevator for purposes of application of res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Reversed; new trial.
1. Trial <S=>168
Directed verdicts are not favored but
may be upheld if jury could not reasonably
and legally have reached conclusion other
than in moving party's favor.
2. Appeal and Error <s=>927(7)
In reviewing trial court's action in directing verdict for defendant, and subsequently refusing to set aside verdict, court
views evidence in light most favorable to
plaintiff.
3. Negligence <s=*121.2(9)
When doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
invoked, jury may infer negligence even
absent direct evidence of negligence.
4. Negligence «=»121.2(9, 10)
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur neither
creates presumption in plaintiff's favor nor
shifts burden to defendant, but merely permits inference of negligence to be drawn
from circumstances of incident.
5. Negligence e=> 121.2(3)
To submit case to jury on theory of res
ipsa loquitur, situation causing injury must
be such that, in ordinary course of events,
no injury would result unless from careless
construction, inspections or use, both inspection and user must have been in control of party charged with neglect, and
dangerous condition must have happened

regardless of any voluntary action by
jured party.
6. Negligence <S^121.2(12)
For purposes of determining whethc
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, coui
takes into account how accidents of partici
lar kind usually occur and, if court decide
that probability of nonnegligent causes ar
as great or greater than probability of nej
ligent cause attributable to defendant
court withdraws case from jury.
7. Carriers £=»:*]6(10)
Products Liability <S=>77
Klevator operator was entitled to hav
court submit res ipsa loquitur theory t<
jury in operator's action based on clain
that elevator manufacturer or buildinj
owner was negligent; even if operato
were contributorily negligent in reversing
elevator direction, any negligence wouk
only reduce amount of damages and no
bar case from being submitted to jury
8. Negligence e=>121.2(7)
Under doctrine of comparative negli
gence, plaintiff can be participant in event«
leading up to injuries suffered without de
priving plaintiff of use of doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur as long as plaintiff was not
sole cause of injury.
9. Carriers €=3316(10)
Manual control of elevator by operator
did not negate any supposition that building owner had exclusive control over elevator for purposes of application of res ipsa
loquitur doctrine.
10. Negligence ®=>I21.2(8)
In jurisdiction with comparative negligence, exclusive control is not required in
order to submit case to jury on theory of
res ipsa loquitur; exclusive control is not
requirement for application of doctrine.

1 i4«>St<»ven J. DeFrank, with whom, on the
brief, was David A. I^ff, New Haven, for
appellant (plaintiff).
Constance L. ftpstein, Hartford, for appellee (defendant Otis Elevator Co.).
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Before DUPONT, C.J., and LA VERY
and FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ.
DUPONT, Chief Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from a directed verdict, granted by the trial court at the close
of the plaintiffs case, in favor of the defendant Otis Elevator Company l in an action
for personal injuries, claiming that the trial
court improperly directed a verdict for the
defendant. 2 The sole issue of the appeal is
whether the trial court should have concluded, as a matter of law, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be applied,
and, therefore, that the case should have
been submitted to the jury. We conclude
that the court should have done so, and,
therefore, that it was improper for the trial
court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant alleging that the defendant was
negligent in failing to inspect, maintain and
repair the elevator that she was operating,
including its compensation chain' and in
failing to warn her of the defective compensation chain. The plaintiff argues that
she presented sufficient evidence for the
jury to infer negligence of the defendant
because it failed to inspect, maintain and
repair the compensation chain of the elevator, and that, therefore, the case should
have been submitted to the jury under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We agree.
[1*2] ii5pDirected verdicts are not favored, but may be upheld if the jury could
not reasonably and legally have reached a
conclusion other than in the moving party's
favor. Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 244,
510 A.2d 1337 (1986); Merola v. Bums, 21
Conn.App. 633, 636, 575 A.2d 1025 (1990).
In reviewing the trial court's action in directing a verdict for the defendant, and
subsequently refusing to set aside the verdict, we must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Petyan v.
1. We refer herein to the defendant Otis Elevator
Company as the defendant. The prior granting
of summary judgment for the defendant city of
New Haven is not part of this appeal.
2. The plaintiff also claims that the trial court
should not have admitted certain evidence. In
view of our disposition of her first claim, it is
unnecessary to reach the second claim.

Ellis, supra; Merola v. Burns, supra. A
plaintiffs case may be established by inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence,
but such inferences must be logical and
reasonable, and cannot be based on mere
conjecture and speculation.
Boehm v.
Kish, 201 Conn. 385, 389, 517 A.2d 624
(1986); Merola v. Burns, supra.
The plaintiff's claim is dependent on
whether the trial court as a matter of law
could conclude that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should be applied, and the case be
allowed to go to the jury. The plaintiff
presented no direct evidence of malfunction
of the elevator, nor of any defect in the
compensation chain, maintenance related or
otherwise, to require the submission of the
question of the defendant's negligence to
the jury, but instead relies on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in order to require the
submission of the defendant's negligence
to the jury.
[3,4] When the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked, it permits the jury to
infer negligence when no direct evidence of
negligence has been introduced.
Malvicini
v. Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., 206 Conn.
439, 441-42, 538 A.2d 690 (1988); Schurgast v. Schumann, 156 Conn. 471, 479-81,
242 A.2d 695 (1968). The doctrine neither
creates a presumption in favor of the plaintiff nor shifts the burden to the defendant,
but merely permits the inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstances
of the incident. Malvicini v.
Stratfield
Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 Conn, at 442,
538 A.2d 690; Ryan v. George L. Lilley
Co.,^51121 Conn. 26, 30, 183 A.2 (1936).
Thus, the doctrine allows the plaintiff to
avoid a directed verdict without directly
establishing negligence. It is a rule of
circumstantial evidence that allows an inference of negligence if the accident is a
type that ordinarily does not occur in the
3. A compensation chain is a balancing mechanism that compensates for the transfer of
weight during an elevator's operation. The
chain involved in this case was approximately
120 feet in length, extending through the twelve
stories of the building, and weighed approximately 360 pounds.

absence of a defendant's negligence. The
doctrine allows an inference to be drawn as
to why the accident happened.
Malvicini
v. Stratfield
Motor Hotel, Inc., supra.
The determination of whether the doctrine
applies is a question of law. Id., 206 Conn,
at 443, 538 A.2d 690.
[5] In Connecticut, three conditions
must be met for a case to be submitted to
the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
They are as follows: " '(1) The situation,
condition, or apparatus causing the injury
must be such that in the ordinary course of
events no injury would result unless from a
careless construction, inspection or user.
(2) Both inspection and user must have
been at the time of the injury in the control
of the party charged with neglect. (3) The
injurious occurrence or condition must have
happened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the party injured.' "
Id., quoting Schurgast v. Schumann, supra.
[6] Whether the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies is a matter of law for the
initial determination of the trial court, and,
therefore, the court must examine the possible causes of the occurrences in order to
determine whether the case should be submitted to the jury. Watzig v. Tobin, 292
Or. 645, 651 n. 5, 642 P.2d 651 (1982). The
court takes into account how accidents of
this kind usually occur and the evidence
introduced; id.; applying common sense as
t factor in the mix. Malvicini v. Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 Conn, at
448, 538 A.2d 690. If the court decides
"that the probabilities of non-negligent
causes are as great or greater than the
probability of a negligent cause attributable to the defendant [the court] withdraws
the case from the jury." Watzig v. Tobin,
supra. On the other hand, if by using the
evidence and | ^ t h e trial court's own understanding of how similar accidents occur,
the court concludes that the probability of
a negligent cause attributable to the defendant is as great or greater than the probability of nonnegligent causes, then the case
is submitted to the jury. "The conclusion
thus reached by the trial judge is tentative
only because the jury may conclude other-

wise." Id. When the court is of the opin
ion that the probability of the defendant's
negligence is greater than the probability
of other causes, the jury is entitled to reacl
the same conclusion. Id.
In this case, the trial court could reason
ably have considered certain facts in deter
mining whether the doctrine of res ipsj
loquitur applies. For fourteen years, th(
plaintiff was an elevator operator for on<
of the three elevators in the Powell Build
ing in New Haven. On the date her inju
ries were sustained, the elevator she was
operating was ascending from the first
floor to the twelfth floor when its compen
sation chain became hooked on a rail brack
et located on the wall of the elevator shaft
The plaintiff was not able to control the
movement of the chain from the interior ot
the cab. Once hooked, the chain then tight
ened up and broke free from two bolts
securing it to the underside of the cab
The cab began to shudder and shake, and
the plaintiff struck her head and shoulder
against the walls of the cab. The chair
then fell to the bottom of the elevator shaft
with a loud crash, which frightened the
plaintiff.
Upon hearing the crash, the
plaintiff, fearing for her safety, reversed
the direction of the elevator as it was approaching the twelfth floor. She directed
the elevator to the nearest floor, the eleventh, where she jumped from the cab sustaining additional injuries. At the time the
plaintiff received her injuries, the defendant had a longstanding exclusive contract
with the building owner to maintain and
inspect the elevator and its component
parts The elevator was installed | ir>tby the
defendant approximately sixty-one years
before the accident. William Hendry, the
defendant's district maintenance supervisor, testified that the accident was caused
by the compensation chain's becoming
hooked on a rail bracket in the elevator
shaft due to excessive sway of the chain.
Hendry further testified that the elevators
were routinely inspected, but that neither
inspection nor testing of the compensation
chain was part of that routine inspection.
The bolts that held the compensation chain
to the underside of the elevator cab were
never changed, and no one other than the
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aeienaant company touched the compensa- mitted to the jury. See Malvicini v. Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 Conn, at
tion chain or the bolts.
On cross-examination, Hendry testified 444, 538 A.2d 690; Watzig v. Tobin, supra,]
that the normal sway of a compensation 292 Or. at 650 n. 4, 642 P.2d 651.| With the]
chain is approximately one to two inches, [adoption of the doctrine of comparative
and in order for the chain to get hooked on negligence, a plaintiff can be a participant
a rail bracket it must sway at least eigh- in the events leading up to the injuries
teen inches. He further testified that for suffered without depriving the plaintiff of
the chain to sway eighteen inches there the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
must be some misoperation of the elevator, as long as the plaintiff was not the sole
such as rapid reversals of direction. He I cause of the injuries, f See Malvicini v. \
had never before seen a compensation Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra. The
chain pulled free of an elevator cab in his doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply
thirty-seven years of employment by the even if the plaintiff's actions contributed to
defendant. He further stated that on one the injury. Watzig v. Tobin, supra.
occasion he had seen the plaintiff make
[9] The plaintiff claims that the element
rapid reversals of direction of the elevator. of control that is necessary for an applicaThe plaintiff, however, testified that her tion of the doctrine has been met because
ascension from the first to the twelfth floor she did not have any control over the comwas routine until she approached the pensation chain. She testified that she
twelfth floor, and that the cab began to never touched any of the exterior parts of
shake and sway before she reversed its the elevator, and that her operation of the
direction to the eleventh floor. She further elevator did not constitute control of the
testified that the crash of the compensation elevator. She asserts that the defendant
chain as it hit the bottom of the elevator had exclusive control of the compensation
shaft occurred before she reversed the di- chain because of the defendant's exclusive
rection of the cab. If a jury believed that contract to maintain the elevator and its
she did not do anything to cause the shak- parts. The defendant argues that the coning of the cab or the dislodging of the trol element was not met because the plainchain, her act of reversing the direction tiff manually | ^controlled the upward and
could not be found to have caused the downward movement of the elevator, thereoccurrence.
by indirectly controlling the compensation
[7,8] [i.^We conclude that the plaintiff chain. Because the compensation chain
presented sufficient evidence as to each was attached to the elevator and responded
element required by the doctrine of res ipsa to the movements of the elevator, the deloquitur for the court to have submitted fendant asserts that the plaintiff as the
the question of its application to the jury. person in control of the elevator had conAs for the first element, we agree with the trol over its attached parts. Relying on
parties that the accident would not have Malvicini, the defendant claims that the
manual control of the elevator by the plainoccurred unless someone was negligent.
tiff negates any supposition that the defenWe also conclude that the third element for
dant had exclusive control and therefore
application of the doctrine was satisfied.
precludes^ the application of the doctrine of
The plaintiff maintains that she was not
res ipsa loquitur. The facts of Malvicini
contributorily negligent. The defendant
however, are distinguishable.
argues that she was. We conclude that
even if she were contributorily negligent in
In Malvicini, the plaintiff, a guest at the
reversing the direction of the elevator, in a defendant's hotel, suddenly heard a "pssst"
jurisdiction that applies the doctrine of sound and was hit by steaming hot water
comparative negligence, such as Connecti- while he was taking a shower, causing him
cut, any negligence on the plaintiffs part to fall and suffer first degree burns as well
would only reduce the amount of damages, as a concussion and other injuries. The
rather than bar the case from being sub- trial court refused to charge the jury on

the theory of res ipsa loquitur, and the
plaintiff appealed. Because there was evidence that the plaintiff had adjusted the
faucets on the day in question, as well as
the night before, the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff failed to meet the control
element of the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
The complaint in Malvicini alleged that the
defendant had exclusive control over the
instrumentality, and, thus, the court discussed control in terms of exclusivity. In
the present case, the plaintiff did not allege
that the defendant had exclusive control
over the instrumentality. Nor is such an
allegation necessary in order to seek application of the doctrine.
The Malvicini court stated that in order
"[fjor the control condition of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to apply, the plaintiff
must adduce evidence from which the
court, as a matter of law, can properly
determine that a jury could reasonably
draw an inference that it is more probable
that not that the person whose negligence
caused the injury was the defendant and
not iisesome other party." Malvicini v.
Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 206
Conn, at 446, 538 A.2d 690. This statement
implies that, in a jurisdiction with comparative negligence, exclusive control is not required in order to submit a case to the jury
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Rather,
the control element requires a balancing
test in which a court must determine
whether a rational basis exists for concluding that it was more probable than not that
the plaintiff's injuries were attributable fro
the defendant's negligence.4 J Malvicinii1
cites Watzig with approval. Watzig makes
it clear that control element used as a test
for the application of the doctrine need not
be exclusive. The submission of the case
to the jury in Connecticut requires "control
of the party charged with neglect."
Schurgast v. Schumann, supra, 156 Conn,
it 480, 242 A.2d 695. The adjective, "exclusive" is conspicuously absent. Malvicini makes it clear that exclusive control is
not a requirement for application of the
4. This balancing test has been followed in sever
al jurisdictions thai have adopted comparative
negligence. See Dermatossian v. New York City
Tiansit Authority, 67 N.Y.2d 219, 501 N.Y.S.2d
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doctrine, but rather a requirement that coi
trol exists and that the application support
fairness. Malvicini v. Stratfield Moto
Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 Conn, at 446, 53
A.2d 690.
f 101 On the facts of this case, the tria
court could reasonably have determines
that the probability that the plaintiff's inju
ries were attributable to the alleged negli
gent actions of the defendant was as grea!
or greater than the probability of a negli
gent cause attributable to the plaintiff, and
that, therefore, the case should have been
submitted to the jury for its ultimate determination.
The judgment is reversed and the case is
remanded for a now trial.
In this opinion the other Judges
concurred.
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jj^The SAVINGS INSTITUTE
v.
KKNYON MANOR CORPORATION
et al.
No. 11291.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued Dec. 10, 1992.
Decided Jan. 26, 1993.
Mortgagee sought to foreclose mortgage, and life tenants claimed special defense alleging that they were in possession
under claim of right. The Superior Court,
Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Robert
Satter, J., struck special defense, and following trial, Freed, J., entered judgment of
strict foreclosure from which tenants ap784, 492 N.Ii.2d I2O0 (1986); Want* v. Tobm.
2^2 Or. 64S, 642 l\2d 6SI (1982); City of
Mompcher v. Duranleau, 145 Vt. 237, 485 A.2d
1269 (1984).
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sue their claims in the March proceeding.
There is ample evidence in the record to
show that what Owens-Corning and Keene
really wanted to do was to proceed against
Fibreboard in a separate trial after the
March trial had been completed. The trial
judge was in the best position to understand what the parties were asking for and
make a determination based on what he
heard. In light of the equivocal statements
of counsel for Owens-Corning and Keene,
we cannot say that the judge was clearly
erroneous in concluding that they were
standing on their claimed right to dismiss
without prejudice or proceed at some future time on their cross-claims.
At oral argument, counsel for OwensCorning stated that Owens-Corning would
have "preferred] to dismiss without prejudice and pursue these cross claims in another proceeding." It is apparent that this
was Owens-Corning's and Keene's first
choice. This was not, however, the choice
that the judge was willing to offer and by
not insisting after March 10 that they
wanted to try their case immediately, Owens-Corning and Keene acquiesced to the
decision that was ultimately made.8
141 One reason that Owens-Corning
and Keene may have wanted to dismiss
their cross-claims without prejudice at this
point in the litigation was that they did not
know the terms of the settlement between
Fibreboard and the plaintiffs. In the last
analysis, however, if Owens-Corning and
Keene had thought that this was integral
to their case, they had an obligation to
raise the issue on March 12, when the
judge needed to and was going to instruct
the jury in this very complex case. By not
doing so, they abandoned the issue and,
thus, cannot now claim that they were prejudiced by the judge's denial of the motion
to disclose the terms of the settlement
agreement.
Admittedly, the settlement between the
plaintiffs and Fibreboard presented Owens-Corning and Keene with additional
8. Based on the statement from counsel for Fibreboard on March 12 about perceived remedies that Owens-Corning and Keene might have
from a reviewing court, we might infer that they
were hoping that the judge would make the

problems. When the plaintiffs settled with
Fibreboard, the burden of proving Fibreboard's liability fell on Owens-Corning and
Keene. At oral argument, counsel for Owens-Corning admitted that "if [plaintiffs]
hadn't settled they would have done our job
for us." Counsel for Owens-Corning and
Keene insist that, regardless of the settlement, they were ready to try their cases.
The realignment of the parties brought
about by the settlement placed the burden
of proving Fibreboard's liability solely on
Owens-Corning and Keene. The judge,
however, had other legitimate considerations that were paramount to those of
Owens-Corning and Keene.
Complex cases such as the one that gave
rise to this appeal are a relatively new
phenomenon. As in this case, one judge is
faced with literally thousands of plaintiffs
and hundreds of defendants. The burden
falls on that judge to keep the case moving
at an orderly pace without sacrificing due
process rights. At the Annual Meeting of
the Conference of Chief Justices, on July
21, 1992, the State Judges Asbestos Litigation Committee presented a report entitled:
"Megatorts: The Lessons of Asbestos Litigation." The report states in part:
"Due process demands fair and equitable
judicial procedures. Realistic opportunities to present a case and rebut an adver*
sary must be preserved. Moreover fair
ness to all litigants cannot be ignored.
The courts cannot provide ideal trials for
asbestos plaintiffs at the expense of leaving other parties waiting in a long queue
to receive judicial attention
The traditional competing goal to fairness is efficiency because courts have an obligation to run economically. By streamlining pretrial processes, utilizing innovative case management and conducting expedited trials more cases can be heard
and settlements achieved.
"In describing case management methods, the tension between fairness and
decision he did and that, after an appeal, they
could try their cross-claims in a separate proceeding. If this was indeed their strategy, the
risks outweigh the benefits, as is evidenced by
the results in this case.

efficiency become obvious Some innovative judges have found ways to increase
both fairness and efficiency; others have
had to make tradeoffs. However, all
judges have learned to increase their
abilities to accommodate both goals."
In the instant case, the trial judge was
ready to proceed with the trial, the jury
had been empaneled and sworn, and some
of the parties had given their opening
statements. The judge, wanting to move
the case forward, offered Owens-Coming
and Keene a choice of dismissing their
cross-claims with prejudice or going forward with their cross-claims at trial. This
was not the choice they wanted, but the
trial judge made it clear that this was what
was available to them. When they continued to balk, the trial judge merely did what
he told them he would do, namely, grant
their motion to dismiss, but with the condition of prejudice. We cannot say that he
abused the discretion given to him by the
Rules.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.
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David SWANN
v.
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, et al.
No. 658, Sept. Term, 1992.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 1, 1993.
Reconsideration Denied March 30, 1993.
Elevator user brought action against
building owner and manager and elevator
maintenance contractor to recover for injuries caused by failure of elevator to level
with floor. The Circuit Court, Montgomery
County, DeLawrence Beard, J., entered

judgment on jury verdict in favor of defendants. Appeal and cross appeal were taken. The Court of Special Appeals, Bishop,
J., held that: (1) evidence of user's collateral source payments from workers' compensation and medical disability plan was admissible; (2) user was entitled to instruction on res ipsa loquitur; and (3) evidence
of specific acts of negligence did not prevent user from relying on doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded
Wilner, C.J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed opinion.
1. Negligence <S=»130(1)
Report by elevator consulting firm criticizing building owner and manager and
elevator maintenance contractor for inadequately stocking spare parts on site and
failing to retain repair orders from service
calls was not probative of notice, standard
of care, or breach of duty in action to
recover for injuries caused by failure of
elevator to level with floor; report was
prepared nine months after the incident.
2. Negligence @=»129
Evidence that elevator did not level
with floor during incident after user was
injured as result of misleveling was irrelevant in user's negligence action; it was
undisputed that elevator did not level with
floor at time of accident.
3. Appeal and Error «=>1058(1)
Evidence of elevator maintenance contractor's document retention policy and preventative maintenance checklist was cumulative of document retention policy admitted into evidence and testimony that contractor had preventive maintenance checklist, and, thus, exclusion was harmless in
negligence action to recover for injuries
caused by failure of elevator to level with
the floor.
4. Negligence e=»125
Evidence that elevator maintenance
contractor knew of misleveling problems in
other elevators was not material to user's
negligence action against building owner
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and manager and elevator maintenance
contractor for injuries caused by failure of
elevator to \eve\ with the floor.
5. Damages «=>182
Evidence of elevator user's collateral
source payments from workers' compensation and medical disability plan was admissible in negligence action against building
owner and manager and elevator service
contractor to show motivation for not returning to work following injury caused by
failure of elevator to level with floor;
user's job at time of injury was sedentary,
medical experts testified that user was capable of sedentary work, user waa able to
drive car for long periods of time, worked
out at gym, and did household chores, and,
thus, there was sufficient evidence of malingering or exaggeration.
6. Pretrial Procedure «=»45, 753
Technical violation of discovery rules
and pretrial order by failing to timely identify expert witnesses to be called at trial
did not prejudice plaintiff and, therefore,
did not entitle him to exclusion of the experts' testimony; plaintiff deposed the experts prior to trial.
7. Appeal and Error <s=»204(7)
Challenge to opinion by witness who
was not qualified as expert was waived by
failure to object. Md.Rule 2-517(a).
8. Evidence «=M71(17)
Building manager's engineer did not
need to be qualified as expert to testify
whether anyone ever recommended to him
that he should keep and maintain records
of elevator company relating to any callbacks, complaints, and maintenance of elevator that caused injury to user by failing
to level with floor; engineer could testify
as lay witness to matters within firsthand
knowledge.
9. Appeal and Error «=»232(2)
Objection to form of question did not
preserve objection that question called for
improper expert testimony. Md.Rule 2517(a).
10. Evidence «=>474(1)
Opinion by building manager's engineer that he would have known about any

problem concerning elevator's failure to
level the floor was admissible despite failure to qualify engineer as expert; opinion
was based on firsthand knowledge and was
not typically given by expert.
11. Evidence «=»474(1)
Elevator maintenance contractor's repairman did not need to be qualified as
expert to testify that he never observed
elevators mislevel by more than inch or
two; the testimony was based on repairman's firsthand knowledge.
12. Witnesses <$=»370(3)
Injured elevator user's race discrimination suit against employer was relevant to
reasons for receiving medical disability and
to credibility in action against building
owner and manager and elevator maintenance company to recover for injuries
caused by failure of elevator to level with
floor; defendants maintained that user waa
disgruntled employee who was being harassed by supervisor, that, contrary to his
testimony, he would not have remained at
employer until retirement age, that he was
not motivated to return to work, and that
employer was motivated to grant him medical disability.
13. Trial «=*203(1), 252(1)
Refusal to instruct jury is error as
matter of law if instruction correctly states
law and law is applicable in light of evidence before jury.
14. Negligence <3=>138(2)
Trial court must instruct on res ipsa
loquitur if it believes that jury, after considering the evidence, or making rational
inferences therefrom, could reasonably find
that plaintiff proved each element by preponderance of evidence.
15. Negligence <s=>121.3
Evidence of specific acts of negligence
in repairing and maintaining elevator did
not prevent injured user from relying on
res ipsa loquitur; user did not purport to
furnish complete explanation of accident
caused by failure of elevator to level with
floor, at close of evidence, there was dispute as to what caused accident, and evf

dence of negligent repair and maintenance
did not refute inference of negligence implied by res ipsa loquitur.
16. Negligence «=» 138(2)
Elevator user who fell in elevator that
had failed to level with floor was entitled to
res ipsa loquitur instruction in action
against maintenance contractor.
17. Negligence <*=>121.3
Elevator could be found to be within
maintenance contractor's "exclusive control" within meaning of res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, even though maintenance agreement purported to place possession or control of elevator with building manager;
contractor manufactured and installed elevator, manager was obligated to prohibit
others from making repairs or adjustments, and nothing indicated that building
owner, manager, or tenant attempted to
repair elevator.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
18. Negligence «=»136(6, 27)
Evidence created jury question whether elevator user was contributorily negligent when he stepped into elevator that
had not leveled with floor, and, thus, evidence created jury question on element of
res ipsa loquitur requiring plaintiff to establish that casualty did not result from act
or omission of plaintiff.
19. Negligence <&=>138(2)
Plaintiff is entitled to res ipsa loquitur
instruction only when plaintiff establishes
casualty of sort which usually does not
occur in absence of negligence and is
caused by instrumentality within defendant's exclusive control under circumstances indicating that casualty did not result from act or omission of plaintiff.
20. Negligence <£=>121.2(6)
Fact that mechanical, electrical, and
electronic devices fail due to nonnegligent
causes does not preclude application of res
ipsa loquitur; element requiring proof that
casualty is sort which usually does not
occur in absence of negligence only requires evidence for reasonable conclusion

that negligence was more likely cause than
other cansos
21. Appeal and Error <s=>2Mi<l>
Allegedly erroneous failure to give
plaintiffs proposed instruction was not preserved, where plaintiffs did not object.
22. Negligence <s=>15
Alleged violation of building code as
result of elevator's failure to level with
floor was not evidence of negligence in
injured user's action against building owner and manager and maintenance contractor; intent of building code was to make
buildings accessible and usable by physically handicapped persons, and since user was
not physically handicapped, he was not
within class of persons sought to be protected. Code 1057, Art. 83B, § 6-102(a)(l).
23. Negligence «=»139(1)
Trial <s=>244(4)
Instruction that landowner had duty to
keep property in safe condition if open to
public, could not delegate duty, and could
not avoid or delegate risk of nonperformance of duty by person hired to perform
maintenance would have overemphasized
duty of building owner and manager,
would have been unduly suggestive and
prejudicial, and did not need to be given in
action by injured elevator user against
building owner and manager; jury had
been fairly and comprehensively instructed
as to duty of landowner to invitee, and trial
court did not state that landowner's duty
was delegable.
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BISHOP, Judge.
Appellant, David Swann ("Swann"), filed
a complaint against Prudential Insurance
Company of America ("Prudential"), Carey
Winston Company ("CW"), and Dover Elevator Company ("Dover") (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Appellees") in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging negligent maintenance of an elevator (Count I) and product liability (Count
II). Swann dismissed Count II. A jury
trial was held on Count I. At the close of
Swann's case and at the conclusion of the
trial, Prudential and CW moved for judgment. The trial court denied their motions
and the jury found in favor of Appellees.
Swann filed a timely notice of appeal. Prudential and CW filed a cross-appeal.

Prudential and CW's Cross-Appeal
IV. Did the trial court err by denying
Prudential's and CW's motions for
judgment?
(A) Was there evidence that Prudential
and CW had notice of a misleveling
problem?
(B) Was there evidence that a breach
of duty owed by CW proximately
caused the elevator to mislevel on February 2, 1987?
Since we decide this appeal in favor of
Prudential and CW based on issnes I, II,
and III, we need not address their crossappeal.
Facts

Issues
Swann's appeal
I. Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence concerning:
(A) the elevator maintenance study
performed by the Newmont Elevator
Company;
(B) post-accident misleveling incidents;
(C) deposition testimony of corporate
officials of Dover and national accident
data of other elevator misleveling incidents of Dover?
II. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning:
(A) collateral source payments;
(B) late disclosed expert witness opinions;
(C) opinions of witnesses neither disclosed nor qualified as expert witnesses;
(D) a race discrimination suit involving
the appellant?
III. Whether the trial court erred in
failing to give:
(A) a res ipsa loquitur instruction;
(B) a missing evidence instruction;
(C) an instruction that a violation of a
statute can be considered evidence of
negligence; and
(D) an instruction that the duty owed
to business invitees by a property owner is non-delegable?

On February 2, 1987, Swann and a coworker, Murtha Donovan, Jr. ("Donovan"),
summoned an elevator (designated "elev*
tor number two") located in their place of
employment. When the elevator arrived, it
did not level properly with the floor, and
Swann tripped and stumbled while boarding. The elevator was "[sjomewhert
around a foot," "[s]omewhat greater than
about a foot," or as many as eighteen
inches below floor level. Ordinarily, the
height of the elevator's door opening was
seven feet. As a result of the incident,
Swann claimed he sustained severe, painful
and permanent personal injuries.
After the elevator arrived but before entering it, Swann looked into the elevator
and saw no exiting passengers. Neither
Swann nor Donovan noticed the elevator
had misleveled until after Swann stepped
into the elevator. At trial, Swann's expert
in the field of human factors psychology
opined that when an elevator door opens,
people ordinarily "look forward at essentially their own eye level, first to see that
the door opens; second, to see that nobody
is coming out; and if there is time later on,
there are two or three seconds available, to
look towards the walking surface itself,1*
When asked if he had an opinion "whether
an elevator that was between six to twelve
inches below the floor level would be able
to be detected in sufficient time to allow

the person to keep from stepping in or
falling into the elevator," he added: "If
somebody knew to look, if they expected
the problem to occur, yes; if they did not,
no
I would not normally expect people
to do a safety inspection adequate to determine that the elevator has not leveled, because they would have no reason to do so."
Elevator number two, an automatic selflervice elevator, was located in a building
owned by Prudential, managed by CW, and
leased exclusively to Swann's employer,
IBM. Dover manufactured and installed
the elevator, and has been under contract
with CW to maintain the elevator ever
since its installation.
The Dover Master Maintenance Service
Agreement ("the Agreement") in effect
from July 1, 1985 through the date of the
incident required that Dover "[r]egularly
and systematically examine, adjust, lubricate and, whenever required by the wear
and tear of normal elevator usage, repair
or replace the equipment (except for the
items stated hereafter), using trained personnel directly employed and supervised by
(Dover] to maintain the equipment in proper operating condition." Although the
Agreement specifically excludes several
elevator components and associated systems, the component that Swann contends
caused the misleveling, the "14 and 15 contacts", was not excluded. Further, CW
agreed that it shall remain in exclusive
"possession or control of the equipment"
and that it would prohibit "others [from]
mak[ing] changes, adjustments, additions,
repairs or replacements to the equipment."

he responded: "(because that is why we
have a contract with Dover to repair the
elevators. 1 do not know anything about
repairing (tie elevators."
Ronald Bothell (" Bothell"), a maintenance repairman for Dover, testified that
he would spend six hours every other week
performing preventive maintenance on the
four elevators in Prudential's building. On
as many as four occasions within a span of
six weeks preceding the incident—December 17, 198b\ January 7, 1987, January 21,
1987, and January 28, 1987—and on the
day of the incident, Dover was advised of
misleveling problems with elevator number
two. A repair order dated January 7 indicates that the 14 and 15 contacts were
"burned closed" and that Bothell cleaned
the contacts and replaced brushes. According to Donald Moynihan ("Moynihan"),
Swann's expert in the field of elevator engineering, installation, design, and maintenance, elevator number two misleveled because the 14 and 15 contacts were filed
clean rather than replaced. Although Dover did not present expert testimony on
elevator maintenance and repair, Bothell
testified that the elevator could not have
misleveled any more than an inch based
upon his observations and experience and,
in any event, cleaning the 14 and 15 contacts was proper and adequate because the
contacts were not welded together, they
merely had an accumulation of crystallized
dust particles.
Other facts will be provided, infra, as
appropriate to the discussion.

Discussion
When an elevator needed repair, IBM
I
contacted CW. CW did not attempt to reSwann
first
contends
that the trial court
pair the elevators; rather, it turned the
elevator off when a problem arose and erred when it excluded testimony and other
placed a call to Dover. Joan Berman, CW's evidence that was both relevant and matesenior vice-president in charge of property rial to the issues in dispute.
management, testified that "[CW] cannot
"For an item of evidence to be admissido anything on th[e] elevator ... [b]ecause
ble, it must be both relevant and materithe only people that are allowed to work on
al. Kvidence is material if it tends to
the elevator based on the [Agreement] are
establish a proposition that has legal sigthe people who come from Dover Elevanificance to the litigation. Evidence is
tor." David Geist, CW's chief building enrelevant if it is sufficiently probative of a
gineer, testified that he was not permitted
proposition that, if established, would
to work on the elevator. When asked why,
have legal significance to the litigation."
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Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 284, 291, 563
A.2d 392 (1989) (quoting Paige v. Manuzak, 57 Md.App. 621, 632, 471 A.2d 758,
cert, denied, 300 Md. 154, 476 A.2d 722
(1984)). This notwithstanding, we must adhere to "the long-standing principle that
the admission or exclusion of evidence is a
function of the trial court which, on appeal,
is traditionally viewed with great latitude."
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 60 Md.
App. 104, 118, 481 A.2d 250 (1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348
(1985). "An appellate court will only reverse upon finding that the trial judge's
determination was 'both manifestly wrong
and substantially injurious.' " Lomax v.
Comptroller of the Treasury, 88 Md.App.
50, 54, 591 A.2d 1311 (1991) (quoting
Paige, 57 Md.App. at 633, 471 A.2d 758).
With these principles in mind, we shall
consider whether the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to admit the evidence
Swann proffered.
(A)
Newmont Elevator Company Study

1987—nine months after the incident—and,
therefore, the trial court properly excluded
it. They assert that the report was not
probative of a breach of duty owed by
Prudential, CW, or Dover, or of any notice
they may have had that the elevator would
mislevel. We agree.
The report was prepared nine months
after the incident and is, therefore, not
probative of notice or a breach of duty.
The report is not a "subsequent remedial
measure" because it is not a change in
Appellees' conduct. Thus, the report doet
not define the standard of care. See 6
Lynn McLain, Maryland Practice § 407.1
(1987 & Supp.1992).
Also, the proffered evidence is cumulative to Moynihan's testimony. Moynihan
testified that the spare parts maintained in
the elevator control room were inadequate
for preventive maintenance. Further, Moy:
nihan testified that CW's failure to keep
the call back and repair order records was
a poor management technique and prevented them from recognizing the repetitive
nature of the problem. The trial court
"may exclude evidence deemed to be cumulative." Lomax, 88 Md.App. at 54, 591
A.2d 1311. Accordingly, the trial court's
decision to exclude the report was not
"manifestly wrong and substantially injurious."

[ 1 ] Swann offered evidence of an evaluation report the Newmont Elevator Company (an elevator consulting firm) prepared
at Prudential's request.
According to
Swann, the report criticized Appellees for
failing adequately to stock spare parts on
site and failing to retain repair orders from
Dover's service calls. Swann argues that
(B)
the study is relevant and material to two
Post-Accident
Misleveling
Incidents
issues: first, the inadequate supply of
spare parts is relevant to the jury's resolu\2) Swann contends that the trial court
tion of whether a particular electrical con- precluded him from introducing evidence of
tact should have been replaced during the misleveling incidents that occurred immediservice call immediately prior to the inci- ately after the February 2nd incident
dent; and second, the failure to maintain Swann argues that subsequent misleveling
call back and repair order records prevent- incidents were relevant and material facta
ed recognition of the pattern of misleveling necessary to give the jury a perspective
incidents occurring before the incident. that demonstrates that Bothell, Dover's reSwann contends the study defines the stan- pairman, did not correct the problem with
dard of care owed by Appellees with re- the elevator on the occasions prior to the
spect to the care and maintenance of the incident. Swann maintains that this ruling
elevator and therefore, is an exception to prohibited him from fully developing his
the rule excluding evidence of subsequent theory of negligence. We disagree.
remedial measures.
During a pre-trial hearing on a motion in
Appellees point out, however, that the limine, Swann argued that the post-incistudy was not prepared until November dent occurrences were probative of the is*

sues of notice and Appellees' ability to correct the misleveling problem. To support
his position, Swann relied on Hagan t\
Wash ington
Subu rba n
Sanita ry
Comm'n, 20 Md.App. 192, 314 A.2d 699
(1974), and cases cited therein, and in his
brief cites Wilson, 317 Md. 284, 563 A.2d
392. Swann's reliance is misplaced. These
cases involve situations where the plaintiff
attempted to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures, or changes in
subsequent practices, not evidence of similar post-incident occurrences.
In Wilson,
for example, the Court of Appeals held that
a change in patient monitoring policies
made after a patient was injured as the
result of a fall from a wheelchair was
"admissible as evidence of the standard of
care required under the circumstances," although inadmissible as an ^admission of
negligence or culpability." 317 Md. at 301,
563 A.2d 392 (emphasis in original).
It is clear that the subsequent incidents
were not "subsequent remedial measures,"
which based on Maryland law are admissible under limited circumstances. It was
undisputed that the elevator misleveled on
February 2nd. Evidence of mislevelings
after the incident was irrelevant and would
have been unduly prejudicial. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion.
(C)
Corporate Officials' Deposition Testimony
[3] The trial court refused to admit into
evidence the deposition testimony of four
Dover officials. Swann contends that the
deposition testimony was relevant and material because it established: 1) there were
numerous misleveling incidents nationwide
greater than the one to two inches Bothell
claimed was the maximum extent the elevator could mislevel; 2) Dover knew of the
large number of misleveling accidents on
similar elevators and was on notice of this
type of problem; 3) Dover had a preventative maintenance checklist for use by mechanics; 4) Dover had a document retention
policy; 5) the frequency and percentages of
tripping accidents caused by misleveling
accidents prior to February 2, 1987; and, 6)
Dover knew of the existence of a substan-

tial number of misleveling problems in its
elevators and was on notice of the magnitude of the problem prior to February 2,
1987.
Appellees argue that since Count II, the
product liability count, was dismissed, the
only remaining count was negligent elevator maintenance and repair, and therefore,
much of the evidence Swann attempted to
introduce was irrelevant. Appellees maintain that evidence of nationwide claims may
have been relevant to Count 11, but had no
relevance as to whether they had notice of
misleveling resulting from the improper
maintenance or repair of elevator number
two. Accordingly, the evidence would have
confused the jury and prejudiced Appellees.
As to the use of the exhibits during crossexamination of Bothell, Appellees contend
that the court simply refused to allow
cross examination of Bothell on issues involving elevators that were not serviced by
him or of which he had no personal knowledge. Appellees explain that all other excluded evidence was cumulative to the testimony of other witnesses.
We perceive no reversible error. Dover's
document retention policy was admitted
into evidence during Swann's direct examination of Moynihan. Furthermore, Bothell
testified that Dover had a preventive maintenance checklist. Thus, the deposition testimony regarding Dover's document retention policy and preventive maintenance
checklist was cumulative and its exclusion
was harmless.
I l l The deposition testimony indicating
that Dover knew of misleveling problems in
other elevators is not material to this case
since Count II was dismissed. Other elevators could have had mechanical problems
while elevator number two was operational
Conversely, elevator number two coul(
have had mechanical problems while othei
elevators, nationwide, were operational
The jury could not make any rational infer
ence regarding the alleged negligent repai
and maintenance of elevator number twi
from the proffered deposition testimony
Accordingly, the trial court did not abus
its discretion.
See
McLain,
supra
§§ 401.1, 402.1.
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Swann attempted to impeach Bothell's
testimony by introducing deposition testimony of misleveling incidents greater than
the one to two inches he claimed was the
maximum extent the elevator could mislevel. As discussed in Section 11(C), infra,
Bothell testified as a fact witness to his
observations concerning elevator number
two. The trial court, by excluding evidence
of misleveling incidents that Bothell did not
observe, properly limited cross-examination
to Bothell's experience with elevator number two.
II
Swann next contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting testimony and other evidence otherwise inadmissible under Maryland law.
(A)
Evidence of Collateral Source Payments
[5] Swann argues that the court erred
by allowing questions regarding Swann's
receipt of workers' compensation and
IBM's medical disability plan payments.
Swann maintains that the evidence was being used in an attempt to reduce Appellees'
liability by showing that Swann continued
to receive income after the incident.
Swann contends that the collateral source
rule allows admission of collateral source
payments only if there is a preliminary
showing of malingering or exaggeration of
injury and that there was no evidence supporting malingering or exaggeration sub
judice.
In Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 42
Md.App. 291, 400 A.2d 440 (1979), a/fd, 287
Md. 223, 411 A.2d 449 (1980), we were
faced with a near identical situation. In
that case, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion in limine in which they requested that the trial court restrict the
defendants "from mentioning social security disability benefits being paid to the
[plaintiff] since they were funds paid ...
from a collateral source and the [defendant] was entitled to no credit in determining the jury's assessment of damages because of such collateral funds." Id. at 295,

400 A.2d 440. We turned to Lcizear v.
Butler, 226 Md. 171, 172 A.2d 518 (1961), in
which the Court of Appeals
noted with approval that the evidence of
collateral payments is admissible if there
is evidence in the case of malingering or
exaggeration of injury but evidence as to
collateral payments is inadmissible in the
absence of evidence of malingering or
exaggeration or where the real purpose
of the evidence offered as to collateral
sources is the mitigation of liability for
damages of the defendant.
Kelch, 42 Md.App. at 296, 400 A.2d 440
(citations omitted). We held that the defendant
raised the issue of exaggeration of the
plaintiff's injuries by the [defendant*']
cross-examination of the attending physician during which the physician conceded
that there was, at least, a suggestion
that the [plaintiff] was unwilling to work
to seek employment possibly because the
social security benefits the [plaintiff] received were greater than he might hive
earned if he were employed.
Id. at 296-97, 400 A.2d 440.
In the case sub judice, the Appellees
made clear during the pre-trial hearing on
the motion in limine that the evidence was
to be introduced solely to show Swann's
motivation for not returning to work. Dur*
ing the trial, there was, "at least, a suggestion" of malingering and exaggeration.
For example, Swann's job at IBM was sedentary in nature. Medical experts testified
that Swann was capable of sedentary work.
There was also evidence that there was "no
psychiatric disability that would keep
[Swann] from working, and little in the
way of physical." A vocational rehabilitation consultant testified that he saw no
reason why Swann could not be in the work
force. Furthermore, one of Swann's own
treating physicians said that he "[couW]
get on with his life." Swann testified that
he never tried to get another job. In 1989,
Swann was able to drive a car for long
periods of time and cut his lawn. In 1990,
he worked out at a gym three times a
week, two hours each time, for three
months. At the time of trial, Swann did his

own laundry and dishes, and bought his
own groceries.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court
properly instructed the jury as follows:
Now, whenever evidence has been admitted for one purpose you should not
consider it for any other purpose. If you
decide that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover lost earnings you are not to use
any evidence of payment received by the
plaintiff for sick leave or disability payments or workman's compensation.
Evidence of those payments have been
admitted in this case for purposes other
than the calculation of lost earnings such
as it bears on the plaintiff's motivation to
work.
Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence
of malingering and exaggeration, and
Swann failed to establish that "the real
purpose of the evidence offered as to collateral sources [was] the mitigation of liability
for damages...." Id. at 296, 400 A.2d
440. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted evidence of collateral source payments.
(B)
Late Disclosure of Expert Witnesses
[6] Swann argues that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to exclude the testimony of improperly disclosed expert witnesses. He contends that Appellees were asked in interrogatories, on May 2, 1989, to identify expert witnesses expected to be called at trial, but, at the time, did not respond to the
question. In a letter dated December 4,
1991, CW and Prudential first identified
experts they intended to call at trial. The
experts were also identified in CW and
Prudential's calendar call statement filed
December 19, 1991, in Dover's calendar call
statement filed December 26, 1991, and in
CW's and Prudential's answers to interrogatories received by Swann on December 31,
1991.
Swann filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Appellees' experts, which the trial
court denied on January 3, 1992. Swann
argues: 1) "Appellees waited until the eve
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of trial which was scheduled for January 6
1992 to disclose the experts hoping thai
this 'eleventh hour' tactic would interfere
with [Swann's] counsel's trial preparation"
and, 2) violated the trial court's order foi
pre-trial procedures which provided that all
discovery be completed within 15 days ol
the Calendar Call (scheduled for December
26, 1991).
Appellees maintain that the trial court
correctly admitted testimony of their experts because Swann was notified of the
identity of the experts, albeit informally, on
December 4, 1991. Appellees explain that
the notification w;is informal in keeping
with the procedurally informal tone of the
case, and that Swann deposed each of the
experts prior to trial; therefore, Swann
was not prejudiced by any violations of
discovery rules or the trial court's pre-trial
order. We agree.
One of the fundamental and principal
[sic] objectives of the discovery rules is
to require disclosure of facts by a party
litigant to all of his adversaries, and
thereby to eliminate, as far as possible,
the necessity of any party to litigation
going to trial in a confused or muddled
state of mind, concerning the facts that
give rise to the litigation.
Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 55, 395 A.2d
126 (1978); see a /so Hadid v. Alexander,
55 Md.App. 344, 351, 462 A.2d 1216 (1983).
" 'A trial judge is vested with a large measure of discretion in applying sanctions for
failure to adhere to the discovery rules.' "
Snyder r. Snyder, 79 Md.App. 448, 461,
558 A.2d 412 (quoting Starfish Condominium Assoc, v. York ridge Sen\ Corj)., 295
Md. 693, 712, 458 A.2d 805 (1983)), cert,
denied. 317 Md. 511, 564 A 2d 1182 (1989).
Although Appellees technically violated discovery rules and the court's pre-trial order,
Swann was not prejudiced. Swann had an
opportunity to, and did in fact, depose the
experts prior to trial. Appellees' conduct
may have made trial preparation more difficult, but they did not hamper Swann's
efforts. Thus, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion under the circumstances sub
judice. We do not in any way intend to
give the impression that we approve of
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Appellees' actions. Counsel should comply
with discovery schedules, and when violated, sanctions may be imposed.
(C)

Opinions of Non-Expert Witnesses
Swann also contends that the trial court
erred by allowing opinion testimony of
three lay witnesses whose testimony was
offered to rebut Moynihan's expert testimony. According to Swann, Berman, CW's
property manager, testified that: 1) there
had been an evolution in the field of property management in the use of consultants;
2) as of February 2, 1987, no elevator consultant had criticized the maintenance and
care being provided to the elevators located
in Prudential's building; 3) Prudential and
CW delegated all of the responsibility for
the care of the elevators to Dover; 4) she
was satisfied with Dover's performance in
maintaining these elevators; and, 5) Appellees did not breach a duty of care owed in
the maintenance of the elevators.
Furthermore, Swann alleges that Geist,
CW's building engineer, rendered improper
expert testimony when he: 1) stated that
no elevator consultant ever criticized the
maintenance Appellees provided before the
incident; 2) opined that the maintenance
records and spare parts were not necessary; 3) testified regarding the frequency
and the nature of the elevator misleveling
problem; and, 4) stated his opinion that if a
problem existed, he would have known
about it.
Swann also complains that Bothell gave
expert opinion testimony that the accident
could not have happened in the way described by Swann and Donovan, including
an analysis of the operation of the number
14 contact and its effect upon the operation
of the elevator.
In short, Swann alleges that, because
Appellees neither identified Berman, Geist,
or Bothell as experts during discovery, nor
qualified each as an expert at trial, the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing the
witnesses' testimony over objection. We
disagree.

"A lay witness may testify and give an
opinion on matters as to which he or she
has first-hand knowledge." Waddell v.
State, 85 Md.App. 54, 66, 582 A.2d 260
(1990). "Whether to allow such testimony
lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court." Yeagy v. State, 63 Md.App. 1, 22,
491 A.2d 1199 (1985). Furthermore, "any
nonexpert may testify to facts coming under his observation, even though the facts
are such as are provable ordinarily by experts." Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666,
669, 57 A.2d 313 (1948). Of course, in
order to preserve for appellate review the
issue of the admission of "opinion" testimony, the complaining party must make a
timely objection. "An objection to the admission of evidence shall be made at the
time the evidence is offered or as soon
thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent. Otherwise, the objection is
waived." Rule 2-517(a). "When a party
has the option of objecting, his failure to do
so is regarded as a waiver estopping him
from obtaining review of that point on appeal." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bragg,
76 Md.App. 709, 719, 548 A.2d 151 (1988).
[71 First, Swann failed to object to Berman's testimony concerning the use of elevator consultants and CW's delegation to
Dover of responsibility for the elevator's
maintenance. Thus, we will not address
Swann's contentions. See Bragg, 76 Md.
App. at 719, 548 A.2d 151. Second, Berman's testimony was not in response to a
question calling for expert testimony. CW
and Prudential asked Berman the following
question:
Can you tell us as of February 2, 1987
and before whether or not anyone—when
I say anyone I mean an elevator consultant, an official from the State of Maryland, some government agency or whatever—has ever proposed or recommended to you that [CW] keep and maintain records of complaints and elevator
maintenance work for themselves?
The question merely asked whether Berman, based upon her experience as CW's
property manager, had ever been advised
by a consultant or state official regarding
inadequate record-keeping. Swann argues

that by testifying that CW had never been
told that they were acting improperly, Berman, in essence, testified that Appellees did
not breach a duty of care owed in the
maintenance of the elevators. The jury
might have inferred from Berman's testimony that Appellees did not breach its duty
of care; however, Berman did not so testify.
[8] Geist was asked whether "in your
experience not only with [CW] but at any
point in time since 1959 has anyone ever
recommended or suggested or proposed to
you that you should keep and maintain
records of an elevator company relating to
any call backs, complaints and the maintenance of that elevator?" For the same
reasons as discussed supra, this was a
proper question for a lay witness. Moreover, Swann argues that Geist offered an
opinion that the maintenance records and
spare parts were not necessary, but we are
unable to find support for this assertion in
the record. Swann directs us to pages
841-43 of the record extract. The only
question preserved for our review on those
pages is the question addressed, supra.
We have carefully reviewed the remaining
portion of Geist's testimony and are unable
to find what Swann says is there.
[9] Swann next complains that "Geist
was permitted, over objection, to testify
about the frequency and the nature of the
elevator misleveling problems." The only
objection Swann made which appears in the
record was to the form of the question, not
to the fact the question called for improper
expert testimony. Accordingly, the issue is
not preserved for our review. See Great
Coastal Express, Inc. v. Schruefer, 34 Md.
App. 706, 724, 369 A.2d 118 ("if counsel
volunteers his grounds at the time of the
objection, he is bound on appeal to the
grounds expressed"), cert, denied, 280 Md.
730 (1977).
[10] Geist also testified that if a problem existed with the elevator, he would
have known about it. Swann asserts that
the question called for expert opinion testimony. Although Geist gave his "opinion"
in the technical sense of the word, the
opinion was based on first-hand knowledge

and was not of the sort typically given by
an expert.
Swann also complains that Bothell "testified in explicit detail about the operation of
the number 14 contact and its effect upon
the operation of the elevator" and that this
was opinion testimony reserved for an expert. Again, we shall not address Swann's
contention because Swann did not object to
this line of questioning. See Bragg, 76
Md.App. at 719, 548 A.2d 151.
[Ill Swann did, however, preserve for
review the question whether the trial court
erred in admitting Bothell's testimony that
the accident could not have occurred in the
way it was described by Swann and Donovan. Bothell testified:
Q How much of a—. Basically because of the mechanism, the clutch that
you are talking about, is there a point
can there be a misleveling?
A Yes, there could be.
Q How much of a misleveling could
there be?
MR. FISHBEIN: Objection, Youi
Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Misleveling t<
what?
I mean, what are you—
BY MR. QUINN:
Q At the floor where the elevator
the car would stop either above or belov
a floor. Can that happen?
A Yes, sir.
Q And is there based upon—. T(
what extent could that he? Could it b<
five inches, ten inches, one inch, wha
could it be?
MR. FISHBEIN: Objection, You
Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A I can only say one inch becaus
that is all I hare ever seen.
Q And the one inch would be what
could it be above or below?
A ft could be either way.
Q Now, what you have just—. Agaii
what you have stated, is that the cii
en instances that yon have observe
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during the time that you have been
servicing the elevator at [Prudential's
building ]?
A Yes, to all four [elevators]. Yes,
sir.
(Emphasis added). It is clear from Bothell's testimony that his opinion was based
solely on his observations of, and experience with, the elevators in Prudential's
building. During cross-examination the
following exchange took place:
Q Now, sir, you have expressed the
opinion today that an elevator cannot
mislevel by more than an inch or two, is
that correct?
A I said I have never seen one.
We are satisfied that Bothell did not render
an expert opinion. He simply stated that
he never observed Prudential's elevators
mislevel by more that an inch or two. See
Galusca, 189 Md. at 669, 57 A.2d 313.
Thus, the trial court properly allowed the
testimony since it was based on Bothell's
first-hand knowledge.

supervisor; 2) that, contrary to his testimony, he would not have remained at IBM
until retirement age of 65; 3) that he was
not motivated to return to work; and, 4)
that IBM was motivated to grant him medical disability. Thus, Appellees argue the
evidence was relevant to Swann's credibility, as well as to the theory that he received
the medical disability for reasons other
than the elevator incident. We agree.
Ill
[13] Swann next contends that the trial
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury
on several theories. A party is generally
entitled to have its theory of the case presented to the jury if two conditions are
satisfied: "(1) the instruction . . . correctly
state[s] the law, and (2) that law [is] applicable in light of the evidence before the
jury." Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md.
186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979). If these
conditions are met, and the trial court nevertheless refuses to instruct the jury, the
court errs as a matter of law. See id. at
204, 401 A.2d 651.

(D)
Race Discrimination Suit
[12 J Swann argues the trial court erred
by allowing Appellees to ask Swann whether he was a party to a lawsuit against IBM.
Swann contends the lawsuit, in which he
alleged racial discrimination, played no part
in the decision of Mr. Yingling, Swann's
supervisor, or Dr. Corey, IBM's medical
advisor, to recommend that Swann be
placed on medical disability. Therefore,
Swann maintains the suit was not relevant
to the issues in the case. Swann adds that
the two supervisors who made the decision
to recommend Swann for medical disability
testified that they did not know of the
discrimination suit until the eve of the trial
sub judice.

" The difficulties arising from the barrel
of flour which rolled out of a warehouse
window in 1863 and into the lives of tort
lawyers,' compounded by Baron Pollock's
casual statement (' "res ipsa loquitur" *)
during argument of the case Byrne v. Boadie, 159 Eng.Rep. 299 (1863) are still with
us today." Blankenship v. Wagner, 261
Md. 37, 38-39, 273 A.2d 412 (1971). Swann
argues that the trial court erred when it
refused to instruct the jury on res ipsa
loquitur.

Appellees contend the evidence was relevant to Swann's credibility, and therefore
admissible.
According to Appellees,
Swann's theory of the case included the
fact that he was permanently disabled, and
retired from IBM on a medical disability as
a result of the elevator incident. Appellees
maintain: 1) that Swann was a disgruntled
employee who was being harassed by his

Appellees do not contend Swann's requested instruction does not correctly state
the law. In fact, Swann's proposed instruction was based on Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 19:5. See MICPEU
Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 446 (1984). Appellees argue the second prong of Pickett's two-part test was
not satisfied, i.e., there was insufficient

(A)
Res Ipsa Loquitur

evidence before the jury to warrant a res
ipsa loquitur instruction. We disagree.
We note preliminarily that both Swann
and Appellees arc apparently under the
impression that the proposed res ipsa loquitur instruction was applicable to Prudential, CW, and Dover. The record clearly indicates, however, that the proposed
instruction only made reference to Dover.
It did not mention Prudential or CW. Accordingly, we shall consider only whether
the trial court erred by refusing to instruct
the jury on res ipsa loquitur with respect
to Dover's liability.

introducing evidence cast upon him, except in (he very limited sense that if he
fails to do so, lie runs the risk that the
trier of fact may . . . find against him.
Hicks, 25 Md.App. at 529-30, 337 A.2d 744.
Appellees cite Flench v. Woodward &
Lothrop, Inc., 18 Md.App. 645, 308 A.2d
439 (1973), for the proposition that a res
ipsa loquitur instruction must only be given after the plaintiff proves each of the
three elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. Beach, however, does not support Appellees' formulation of the law.

[Ml The Restatement (Second) of Torts
The law concerning the doctrine of res
§ 3281) (1964) provides in pertinent part:
ipsa loquitur was reviewed at length in
(2) It is the function of the court to deChesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v.
termine whether the inference may reaHicks, 25 Md.App. 503, 337 A.2d 744, cert
sonably
he drawn by the jury, or whether
denied, 275 Md. 750 (1975). In Hicks, we
it must necessarily be drawn.
recounted the evolution of what is now a
(3) It is the function of the jury to deterthree-part test to determine the doctrine's
mine whether the inference is to be
applicability. In order to invoke the docdrawn in any case where different contrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff
clusions may reasonably be reached.
must establish:
"1. A casualty of a sort which usually Comment e to § 3281) adds:
It is enough that the facts proved reasondoes not occur in the absence of
ably permit the conclusion that neglinegligence.
gence is the more probable explanation.
2. Caused by an instrumentality within
This conclusion is not for the court to
the defendant's exclusive control.
draw,
or to refuse to draw, in any case
3. Under circumstances indicating that
where either conclusion is reasonable;
the casualty did not result from the
and even though the court would not
act or omission of the plaintiff."
itself find negligence, it must still leave
Hicks, 25 Md.App. at 516, 337 A.2d 744
the question to the jury if reasonable
{quoting Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling
men might do so.
Co., 261 Md. 541, 547-48, 276 A.2d 81
(Emphasis added). Accordingly, the triall
(1971)); see also Giant Food, Inc. v. Washcourt must instruct the jury on res ipsal
ington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md.
loquitur if it believes the jury, after con-l
592, 597, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Ramsey v.
sidering the evidence, or making rational!
D.P.A. Assocs., 265 Md. 319, 325, 289 A.2d
inferences therefrom, could reasonably]
321 (1972); Harris v. Otis Elevator Co., 92
find that the plaintiff proved each element!
Md.App. 49, 52, 606 A.2d 305 (1992). Once
I by a preponderance of the evidence. See\
the tripartite test is met,
Fields v. Morgan, 39 Md.App. 82, 83, 382
[t]he doctrine ... provides a permissible
A.2d 1099 (1978) (discussed in Section
inference of negligence. This means
111(A)(3), infra ); Hunch 18 MH Apn^at
that the inference of negligence to be
649-50. 308 A.2d 139 ({Whether a'Turvl
drawn from the circumstances is left to
would accept appellant's testimony as credthe jury. They are permitted, but not
ible ... is a question for the jury, not the]
compelled to find it. As for the plaintiff,
• I
the doctrine furnishes sufficient evidence lyourts. to decide.").
115.1 Before we turn to each of the
to go to the trier of fact. As for the
defendant, the burden of proof is not three elements, it is important to address
shifted to him, nor is any burden of first an issue not raised by the parties. At
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trial, Swann introduced specific evidence of
Dover's (i.e., Bothell's) negligence: 1) its
failure to replace the 14 and 15 contacts; 2)
its failure to spend adequate time maintaining the elevator; 3) its failure to stock an
adequate supply of spare parts in Prudential's building; and, 4) its failure to use a
preventive maintenance checklist. This
raises the question of whether a plaintiff,
who makes out a prima facie case of negligence based on evidence of specific acts of
negligence, may rely on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur and have the jury instructed
on both negligence and res ipsa loquitur.
In earlier cases, the Court of Appeals
held that "if there is direct evidence of
negligence, and all the facts causing the
injury are known and testified to by witnesses at the trial," Frenkil v. Johnson,
175 Md. 592, 605, 3 A.2d 479 (1939), "there
is no basis for the application of [res ipsa
loquitur]," Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 111
Md. 393, 411, 9 A.2d 572 (1939). See also
Smith v. Baltimore Transit Co., 214 Md.
560, 566, 136 A.2d 386 (1957), and cases
cited therein; Recent Decision, Torts—Res
Ipsa Loquitur Not Available To Plaintiff
Who Attempts to Prove Specific Acts of
Negligence, 22 Md.L.Rev. 174 (1962).
For example, in Smith v. Bemfeld, 226
Md. 400, 174 A.2d 53 (1961), the plaintiffs
brought suit for personal injuries and medical expenses incurred as the result of a fall
from a beauty salon chair. The plaintiffs
attempted to establish defendant's negligence by offering evidence to indicate that
the chair was defectively constructed, and
that defendant's employees knew of its defective nature, yet failed to bolt the chair
to the floor or provide another type of chair
which would not tip over. Chief Judge
Brune, speaking for the Court of Appeals,
stated:
[W]e think that the plaintiffs' attempt to
establish specific grounds of alleged negligence precludes recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Smith v.
Baltimore Transit Co., 214 Md. 560, 566,
136 A.2d 386; Maszczenski v. Myers, 212
Md. 346, 352, 129 A.2d 109; Coastal
Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137, 145,
106 A.2d 98, Hickory Transfer Co. v.
Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 262-263, 96 A.2d

241; Strasburger v. Vogel, 103 Md. 85,
63 A. 202, We accordingly hold that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not available to the plaintiffs here.
Id. 226 Md. at 409, 174 A.2d 53. Seven
months later, however, Chief Judge Brune
qualified the Court's holding in Smith.
[I]t seems desirable to point out a limitation upon the scope of [the Smith ] opinion. In that case all of the facts with
regard to the actual happening of the
accident had been developed, and when
developed, they were held insufficient to
establish negligence on the part of the
defendant. It was in that context that
we said ... that "the plaintiffs' attempt
to establish specific grounds of alleged
negligence precludes recourse to the doetrine of res ipsa loquitur." Each of the
cases cited in support of this statement
was a case in which the facts had been
similarly disclosed; and the plaintiffs
difficulty was that the evidence did not
stop at the point of showing the happening of the accident under circumstances
in which negligence of the defendant was
a permissible inference . . . , but went further and showed how the accident happened and so removed the basis for invoking the doctrine
On the facts of Smith v. Bemfeld,
supra, there was no occasion to extend
the rule further than the holdings of the
cases cited; and to avoid possible misunderstanding, we now state that the quoted comment was not intended to and
should not be treated as extending the
rule of those cases. We adhere to the
rule as stated by Judge Hammond in the
Coastal Tank Lines case: "We think
that 'the facts and the demands of justice' do not require that an inference be
permitted to be drawn as a matter of
right where all of the circumstances of
the occurrence are shown by the testimony."
Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 532-38,
180 A.2d 677 (1962) (citations omitted). If
any confusion remained after Jacobs, a la*
ter case, Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md.
37, 273 A.2d 412 (1971), made clear that an
attempt to prove specific acts of negligence
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does not necessarily preclude reliance on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In Blankenship, the plaintiff, a delivery
man, sustained personal injuries while moving a refrigerator into defendant's home.
Plaintiff and his co-worker were "bringing
[the refrigerator] into the house via the
rear steps and a porch which had been built
by the [defendant]." Id. at 39, 273 A.2d
412. Plaintiff's co-worker fell through one
of the steps, and plaintiff "therefore had to
hold the refrigerator from above in order
to keep it from falling on his co-worker."
Id. at 40, 273 A.2d 412. As a result, plaintiff injured his back.
At trial, plaintiff "was somewhat intimidated by Judge Sobeloff's comment in
Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md.
253, 263, 96 A.2d 241 (1953), that 'Paradoxically, the plaintiffs proved too much and
too little.' Fearful of proving 'too much'
he called only the defendant property owner ... and the plaintiff...." Id. 261 Md.
at 39, 273 A.2d 412 (footnote omitted).
Plaintiff then rested his case, relying on
res ipsa loquitur, and the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
On appeal, the Court held that this was a
proper case for submission to the jury on
res ipsa loquitur, and stated that plaintiff
"might properly have attempted to prove
more than he did without weakening his
reliance on res ipsa loquitur." Id. at 45,
273 A.2d 412. The Court then embarked
on a discussion of its earlier cases, including Smith and Jacobs.
Early in this Court's consideration of
res ipsa loquitur we held that when a
plaintiff relies on the doctrine and its
attendant inferences, it must not appear
from the plaintiffs own evidence that
something other than the defendant's
negligence caused the accident. This
concept was logically extended so that
"where all the facts and circumstances
are shown by testimony," whether it was
introduced by plaintiff or defendant, and
that evidence shows that the injury
might have been caused by something
other than the defendant's negligence,
res ipsa loquitur would not apply, be-

cause there would no longer be any need
for relying on an inference. In Smith v.
Bemfeld, Chief Judge Brune, speaking
for the Court, stated that the attempt by
the plaintiffs in that case to prove specific grounds of negligence precluded their
relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, in Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs,
an opinion also written by Chief Judge
Brune only 7 months after Smith v.
Bemfeld, he explained that the attempts
by the plaintiffs in Smith to establish
specific grounds of negligence had precluded their relying on res ipsa loquitur
only because they had proved all of the
farts regarding the accident and were
unable to show that the defendant's negligence caused the injury. He specifically disavowed any intention in Smith of
extending the rule of the earlier
cases....
If the plaintiff has circumstantial evidence which tends to show the defendant's negligence (and which is therefore
consistent with the inference relied upon
in res ipsa loquitur) he should not as a
matter of policy be disrou raged from
coming forth with it. If, however, the
evidence introduced by the plaintiff or
the defendant shows that everything relative to the case is known, and that the
injury might have been caused by something other than defendant's negligence
(thereby negating the inference normally
relied upon in res ipsa loquitur), then
the plaintiff will not be allowed to avai
himself of the doctrine. In such a case
if plaintiffs proof fails to make out i
prima facie case of negligence then it n
proper to direct a verdict for the defen
dant.
Id. 261 Md. at 45-46, 273 A.2d 412 (cita
tions omitted) (emphasis added in part).
In light of Blankenship, it is clear tha
Maryland is aligned with the majority o
American jurisdictions which hold that "ai
unsuccessful attempt to prove specific nef
ligence on the defendant's part, or the ir
troduction of evidence of specific negl
gence not clearly establishing the precis
cause of injury, will not deprive the plaii
tiff of the benefits otherwise available ui
der the doctrine (of res ipsa loquitur\
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Annotation, Evidence of Specific Negligence as Affecting Reliance on Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 33 A.L.R.2d 791, 798 (1954).
Therefore,
where the evidence of specific negligence
introduced does not purport to furnish a
complete explanation of the occurrence,
or where there is a dispute at the close of
the evidence as to what the precise cause
of the accident was, or where reasonable
men might differ as to the effect of the
evidence before the jury, the plaintiff is
not required to prove the specific acts of
negligence as alleged, but may rely upon
the proof and its reasonable inferences to
establish a prima facie case of general
negligence.
1 Stuart M. Speiser, Res Ipsa Loquitur
§ 5:19, at 190 (1972).
In the case subjudice, Swann attempted
to prove that Dover negligently repaired
elevator number two on January 7th by
cleaning the number 14 and 15 contacts
rather than replacing them. Swann also
attempted to prove that Dover negligently
maintained the elevator. Swann did not,
however, purport to furnish a complete explanation of the accident. Indeed, Swann
offered evidence establishing that Dover
responded to reports of mislevelings on two
separate occasions following the January
7th repair. There was no evidence of what,
if any, corrective measures Dover took on
those dates. It may well be that Dover
negligently repaired the elevator on one, or
both, of those occasions and such negligent
act or acts caused the February 2nd misleveling incident. Further, at the close of the
evidence, there was a dispute as to what
caused the accident. Bothell testified that
it was proper to clean, rather than replace,
the 14 and 15 contacts, and that the door
clutch mechanism prevents the elevator
doors from opening when the elevator cab
is greater than an inch or two from floor
level. Therefore, "reasonable men might
[have] differfed] as to the effect of the
evidence before the jury." See id.
[E]ven though the jury could have properly found that the accident was caused
by such a specific act of negligence, and
was so instructed by the trial court, it
has been held that the mere fact that the

plaintiff seeks to bolster his case by specific evidence should not compel him to
forgo reliance on res ipsa loquitur, or to
elect between res ipsa and specific negligence, unless the proof adduced by the
plaintiff actually refutes or negates the
inference which might otherwise be
drawn from application of the doctrine.
Id. § 5:20, at 193 (citation omitted). In this
case, evidence that Dover negligently repaired and maintained elevator number two
neither refutes nor negates the inference
of negligence supplied by the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. In fact, the evidence, if
believed, supports and is consistent with an
inference of negligence.
The evidence of Dover's negligent repair
and maintenance
may merely support one of the many
possible explanations of the accident,
known or unknown. If the jury finds
that it was the specifically proved act of
negligence which occasioned the accident, that is the end of the matter. But,
if the jury deems the specific evidence
unconvincing, there is no reason whatever why it may not infer that the remaining possible causes, though they be unidentified, still point to the negligence of
the defendant.
Id. at 194. In other words, specific proof
may show just how the accident happened and this showing may preclude the
likelihood of defendant's negligence or so
reduce it as to leave an insufficient basis
in probabilities for an inference of negligence
Short of this, the fact that a
plaintiff offers specific proof should be
given no more than its logically probative
effect, and this may not eliminate some
of the possible explanations of the occurrence
[The evidence] may, if credited, lead to a finding of specific negligence
In that case[,] the doctrine of
[res ipsa loquitur] is not needed. But if
the proof of that explanation fails (either because it is legally insufficient or
because it is not credited), the mere fact
that it was offered has no logical tendency to eliminate other explanations
involving . . . negligence ..., and then

is no sound basis for denying application of the
doctrine....
4 Fowler V. Harper, et al., The Law of
Torts § 19.10, at 67-68 (2d ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we hold that Swann's attempt to prove specific acts of negligence
did not prevent him from requesting that
the jury be instructed on both negligence
and res ipsa loquitur. Our decision is
consistent with Maryland law, see Blankenship, 261 Md. at 46, 273 A.2d 412; Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v.
Bowles, 25 Md.App. 558, 564, 334 A.2d 532
(1975) (res ipsa loquitur applied despite
testimony of plaintiffs expert that defendant automobile operator was intoxicated
at the time his car ran off the road and
struck plaintiff), and the law of other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Domany v. Otis Elevator
Co., 369 F.2d 604, 614 (6th Cir.1966) (applying Ohio law), cert, denied, 387 U.S. 942, 87
S.Ct. 2073, 18 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1967); Coffey
v. Brodsky, 165 Ill.App.3d 14, 116 Ill.Dec.
16, 21-22, 518 N.E.2d 638, 643-44 (1987),
cert, denied, 119 I11.2d 554, 119 Ill.Dec.
383, 522 N.E.2d 1242 (1988); Abbott v.
Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 502, 297
N.Y.S.2d 713, 719-20, 245 N.E.2d 388, 39394 (1969); Burgess v. Otis Elevator Co.,
114 A.D.2d 784, 495 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378
(1985), affdf 69 N.Y.2d 623, 511 N.Y.S.2d
227, 503 5l.E.2d 692 (1986); Weeden v. Armor Elevator Co., 97 A.D.2d 197, 468
N.Y.S.2d 898, 901-02 (1983); see also Annotation, Evidence of Specific Negligence as
Affecting Reliance on Res Ipsa Loquitur,
33 A.L.R.2d 791 (1954); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D, cmt. m (1963) ("The
view which now tends to prevail is that res
ipsa loquitur may still be applied, to the
extent that the inference to be drawn supports the specific allegation or the specific
proof
").
As one court observed, rather than being penalized for going forward and
making as specific a case of negligence
as possible, a plaintiff entitled to the
benefits of res ipsa loquitur should be
encouraged to prove as much as possible,
there being no reason why such proof
should wholly dispel the inference any
more than it would in any other case,

since the end result is not injurious to the
defendant. On the contrary, he is in a
better position in so far as he has specific
evidence to meet before the trier of fact
that may be helpful to him, and the case
should go to such trier with the genera
inference of negligence plus other evi
dence of specific facts to be weighec
against the defendant's showing
Speiser, supra, § 5:20, at 194-95.
(1)
[16] The first element in Hicks* three
part test is whether Swann's "casualty
[was] of a sort which usually does no
occur in the absence of negligence." Ap
pellees do not dispute that this criterioi
was satisfied. We are likewise satisfie<
that a reasonable jury could rationally infei
that an elevator does not ordinarily mislev
el in the absence of someone's negligence
Svv Beach, 18 Md.App. at 649, 308 A.2d 43!
("It is a rational inference that escalator
do not ordinarily stop, then start up with i
jerk, without negligence."); Bigio v. Oti
Elevator Co., 175 A.l).2d 823, 573 N.Y.S.2<
1%, 197 (1991) ("it was reasonable for th
jury to conclude that the misleveling of th
elevator was not the kind of event to occu
in the absence of negligence"); Burgest
495 N.Y.S.2d at 379 ("misleveling of eleva
tor . . . was an event of a kind which woul
not ordinarily occur in the absence of negl:
gence"); Weedvn, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 904 ("ov
ershooting and off-leveling" of elevato
would not ordinarily occur had defendan
exercised due care); see a/so Ruiz v. Oti
Elevator, 146 Ariz. 98, 703 P.2d 1247, 125
(Ct.App.1985) (whether an elevator ma
function would ordinarily not occur abser
someone's negligence is a jury question i
borderline cases). Appellees, howevei
take issue with the second and third eh
ments of the Hicks test.
(2)
117] Appellees argue that Swann's a
leged injuries were not "caused by an ii
strumentality within the (Appellees'] excli
sive control." Appellees contend the elev;
tor was not within the exclusive control <
Appellees because IHM was the only tenai
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in the building, and IBM was not named as
a defendant. They reason that IBM, as
sole tenant of the premises, shared control
over the elevators which negates the element of Appellees' exclusive control. In
light of the fact that Swann only preserved
the issue of whether a res ipsa loquitur
instruction was appropriate as against Dover, we do not consider whether Appellees
had joint exclusive control over the elevator. We shall only address whether Dover
had "exclusive control."
We recently addressed the element of
exclusive control in Harris v. Otis Elevator Co., 92 Md.App. 49, 606 A.2d 305
(1992). In Harris, the plaintiff was injured
when she alighted from an elevator which
had misleveled three to six inches below
floor level. At the time of the accident, the
elevator was being used to carry passengers. At other times, however, the elevator had been used to carry freight. The
plaintiff testified that:
"A: [Persons using the elevator for
freight purposes] would load it, they
would bang it against the top of the
elevator, if they could not fit a piece into
the elevator, they would shove it in. I
have seen where doors have been jammed open, and tried to—the furniture
being moved out, if they have not been
able to get it around the corner, it—that
is what I would interpret as being mishandled.
Q: Did you see them putting things in
front of the door so they would not shut,
so they are kind of banging open and
banging open?
A: Yes."
Id. at 54, 606 A.2d 305. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for judgment because "the use and operation of the
elevator by other tenants precluded a finding that [the elevator repair company] possessed exclusive control of the elevator."
Id. at 51, 606 A.2d 305.
We held that the elevator repair company
was not in exclusive control of the elevator.
In doing so, we relied on Smith v. Kelly,
246 Md. 640, 229 A.2d 79 (1967). In Smith,
the plaintiff, a patron of defendant's laundromat, was injured when a piece of a

drum of an extractor broke off and was
flung from the drum which contained a
spinner basket revolving at 1750 r.p.m.
The trial court directed a verdict for the
defendants. After summarizing the conditions required for the application of res
ipsa loquitur, the Court of Appeals determined that it was not applicable to the
facts of the case. The Court noted that
The extractor located on appellees' premises was in constant use for various periods of time by members of the public
who had exclusive possession and control
over it while it was in use. The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is not available in
the case since the machine was not in the
sole control of appellees.
Id. at 644, 229 A.2d 79; see also Ramsey,
265 Md. at 326, 289 A.2d 321 (1972) ("A
glass door through which occupants of an
apartment house and their guests constantly pass and repass is not under such exclusive control of the landlord as to permit
invocation of the res ipsa doctrine."), overruled on other grounds by B & K Rentals
and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco
Co., 324 Md. 147, 596 A.2d 640 (1991);
Dorsey v. General Elevator Co., 241 Md.
99, 107, 215 A.2d 757 (1966) (elevator service company did not have control of elevator because it was manually operated);
Burkowske v. Church Hosp. Corp., 50 Md.
App. 515, 523, 439 A.2d 40 (defendant hospital did not have exclusive possession and
control over a bench that collapsed for unknown reasons), cert, denied, 293 Md. 331
(1982). In Lee v. Housing Auth., 203 Md.
453, 462, 101 A.2d 832 (1954), the Court of
Appeals observed:
The element of control has an important
bearing as negativing the hypothesis of
an intervening cause beyond the defendant's control, and also as tending to
show affirmatively that the cause was
one within the power of the defendant to
prevent by the exercise of care. Thus it
has been held that the inference is not
permissible where the plaintiffs' testimony tends to show an exculpatory cause,
or where the lapse of time and the oppor*
tunity for interference by others weakens the probability that the injury is at-

tributable to the defendant's act or omission.
(Citation omitted).
In Harris, there was substantial evidence that the elevator was subject to
abuse and mishandling.
Likewise in
Smith, the washing machine was constantly used, and perhaps abused, by patrons.
In the case sub judice, however, the jury
could have found that there was no such
exculpatory cause and that others had no
opportunity to interfere with the elevator's
mechanical components.
The logical basis for [the exclusive control] requirement is simply that it must
appear that the negligence of which the
thing speaks is probably that of defendant and not of another.
*
*
*
*
*
*
The fallacy of the "exclusive control"
test is seen in many situations where the
doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur ] is unhesitatingly applied despite absence of "control." Where for instance the defendant's duty of care with respect to the
injuring agency is (as to the plaintiff)
nondelegable, the fact that control may
have been in an independent contractor
will not preclude the application of the
doctrine. And there are many situations
where "it is clear that 'control' is simply
the wrong word1." Where a fuse misfires, or a bottle explodes, the inference
of negligence may still point to the manufacturer or bottler if the proof eliminates the probability of other causes,
even though the mishap occurs at a time
and place remote from defendant's control.
Harper, supra, § 19.7 (2d ed. 1986) (footnotes omitted); see also Leikach, 261 Md.
at 548, 276 A.2d 81.
The majority of states considering the
exclusive control issue under facts similar
to those sub judice have concluded that an
elevator maintenance company is in exclusive control of an elevator it services. In
Burgess v. Otis Elevator Co., 114 A.D.2d
784, 495 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1985), affd, 69
N.Y.2d 623, 511 N.Y.S.2d 227, 503 N.E.2d
692 (1986), the plaintiff tripped while exiting an elevator that had misleveled by two

to five inches above floor level. The defendant elevator company had a service contract with the building owner "whereunder
it was obligated to maintain the elevators
in proper and safe operating condition, systematically inspect them, and repair any
defective parts." Id. 495 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
The trial court instructed the jury on negligence and res ipsa loquitur, and the jury
returned a plaintiff's verdict. Defendant
appealed and challenged, in part, the propriety of the res ipsa loquitur instruction.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, held that the res ipsa loquitur
instruction was appropriate given the fact
that plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence of
the three elements necessary to invoke the
doctrine. The Court acknowledged that
the second element, "exclusive control of
the instrumentality, (was) shown, given
[the building owner's) reliance upon defendant's expertise to inspect and maintain the
intricate devices of the elevator in reasonably safe operating condition, pursuant to
the service agreement." Id. 495 N.Y.S.2d
at 380. In doing so, the Court quoted a
passage from an earlier case, Weeden v.
Armor Elevator Co., 97 A.D.2d 197, 468
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1983).
" 'Exclusivity' is a relative term, not an
absolute. 'The logical basis for [the control] requirement is simply that it must
appear that the negligence of which the
thing speaks is probably that of defendant and not of another.' (2 Harper and
James, IThe Law of Torts], § 19.7, p.
1085."
_ _ 495 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (alterations in original).
In Weeden, the plaintiff was injured
when an elevator in which she was riding
" 'passed the third floor and went to the
top ...[,] hit something ...[,] shook ...,
and went down to the third floor and ...
bounced back up again.' " 468 N.Y.S.2d at
899. The plaintiff filed an action against
the defendant elevator company, "the manufacturer and sole maintenance company
under contract with the [building owner] to
service (the elevator)." Id. 468 N.Y.S.2d at
900. The trial court refused to instruct the
jury on res ipsa loquitur, and the jury
returned a defendant's verdict. The appel-
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late court reversed. In addressing the exclusive control element, the Court recognized
that all general maintenance and repair
work on the operating mechanism of [the
elevator] was performed solely by [defendant] pursuant to its service contract
with the [building owner]. The latter's
"mechanical
responsibilities"
merely
comprised the changing of fuses where
necessary
. . . , presumably, general
housekeeping and cleaning of the visible
interior and exterior portions of the cab,
and the shutting off of power to any cab
exhibiting a mechanical problem. In
sum, the [building owner] relied upon
[defendant], as an expert in elevator
maintenance, to locate and remedy any
defects, and in such capacity, [defendant]
had exclusive control of the inspection
and maintenance of [the elevator].
Id. 468 N.Y.S.2d at 904; see also Bigio, 573
N.Y.S.2d at 197 (res ipsa loquitur instruction appropriate in an elevator misleveling
accident).
The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed
the issue of exclusive control in American
Elevator Co. v. Briscoe, 93 Nev. 665, 572
P.2d 534 (1977). The Court in Briscoe held
that an elevator maintenance company that
had an exclusive contract to maintain and
repair an elevator had exclusive control of
the elevator. The Court found that the
plaintiff
presented facts to the jury which would
indicate that some negligent maintenance
had occurred. The . . . incident was not
an isolated phenomenon. Evidence was
adduced through several [building] employees which showed anomalies in the
elevator's operation on many occasions
prior to the . . . accident.
*
*
*
*
*
*
To require a plaintiff to establish exclusive control in the defendant with respect to any possible cause of the accident before permitting the application of
res ipsa loquitur would emasculate the
doctrine.
He was required, as was
done, only to produce sufficient evidence
from which it could be said that it was

more likely than not that it was negligence on the part of his adversary.
Id. 572 P.2d at 537 (emphasis added in
part).
In addition to New York and Nevada,
Florida and Pennsylvania appear to take a
similar stand. See Commercial
Union
Ins. Co. v. Street, 327 So.2d 113 (Fla.Dist
Ct.App.1976); Johnson v. Otis
Elevator
Co., 225 Pa.Super. 500, 311 A.2d 656 (1973).
Other states have addressed the issue, but
have concluded that a res ipsa
loquitur
instruction was inappropriate. The facts in
those cases, however, can be distinguished
from the facts sub judice.
For example, in Bias v.
Montgomery
Elevator Co., 216 Kan. 341, 532 P.2d 1053
(1975), a "falling elevator" case, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the case
was inappropriate for submission to the
jury on res ipsa loquitur.
The Court observed that
[t]he operation of the automatic elevator
. . . involved highly complex electrical
and mechanical equipment which was designed, manufactured and installed by
a company other than defendant.
The
responsibility of a maintenance company
does not extend to manufacturing defects, but is limited to liability for negligence in the performance of its duties.
The defendant company had no control
over any design defects, mistakes in installation, or any possible faulty construction of the elevator shaft. These
are all possible causes of the accident
which would not have been subject to the
control of defendant.
Id. 532 P.2d at 1057-58 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). The Court of Appeals of
Washington likewise concluded that the trial court properly refused an instruction on
res ipsa loquitur in Murphy v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 65 Wash.App. 112, 828
P.2d 584 (1992). In that case, the plaintiff
was injured when the elevator she was
stepping out of dropped two to four inches
below floor level. The defendant elevator
repair company was under contract to
maintain and repair the elevator. The
building owner's director of engineering,
however, "periodically inspected the defen-
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dant's] work, look|ed] at the elevator and
elevator rooms to insure they were in proper order, and occasionally watch[ed the defendant] service the elevators." Id. 828
P.2d at 586. "[I]f a part needed replacement [the repairman] would go to [the
building owner] for authorization
" Id.
The Court reasoned that "[bjecause [the
building owner] retained some control over
the elevators, and because its contract with
[defendant] was only a limited service contract, [defendant] did not have exclusive
control of the elevators." Id.
Other states have considered the exclusive control element in cases with facts
materially different from those sub judice
and have concluded that res ipsa loquitur
was inapplicable. See, e.g., Stines v. Otis
Elevator Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 608, 60 Ill.Dec.
399, 401, 432 N.E.2d 1298, 1300 (1982) (no
evidence that elevator repair company was
in control of elevator at time of accident);
Pedersen v. White-Evans
Elevator Co.,
511 N.E.2d 460, 464 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (no
evidence that defendant's
negligence
caused elevator "overshooting"; furthermore, there was evidence suggesting that
the malfunction was caused by the lack of
a proper amount of voltage to the elevator—the power supply was in the building
owner's exclusive control, not the elevator
repair company's); Hillas v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 120 N.J.Super. 105, 293 A.2d
419, 424 (element of exclusive control negated where the elevator, although automatically operated, can be stopped by opening its inner gate at a distance of five or
seven inches below the landing sill), cert,
denied, 62 N.J. 82, 299 A.2d 80 (1972);
Parise v. Otis Elevator Co., 100 Ohio App.
200, 136 N.E.2d 113, 116-17 (1954) (some
repairs to the elevator were made by the
building owner's maintenance department,
and the building owner's employees tampered with and abused the elevator); Seay
v. General Elevator Co., 522 P.2d 1022,
1027 (Okla.1974) (defendant elevator repair
company not in exclusive control of elevator where plaintiff was "acquainted with
the door opening qualities of the elevator
.... had been squeezed by them or other
similar doors in that bank of elevators,
knew that the doors could be held open by
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placing ;\ hand upon them, had seen this
done during her frequent use of the elevators, and yet did not employ the means at
hand to control the door prior and during
her exit"); Brottz v. St. Judes Hosp. Clinic, 184 W.Va. 594, 402 S.E.2d 263, 267-68
(1991) (where three parties—the elevator
owner, the elevator designer and installer,
and the elevator maintenance company—
each could be deemed to have some control
over the elevator, and the plaintiff failed to
establish that the latter, under its maintenance contract, was probably responsible
for the accident).
We are aware of three states—Louisiana, North Carolina, and Ohio—that view
the exclusive control element in a more
narrow fashion and, if presented with a
case with facts identical to those sub judice, would likely conclude that the exclusive
control element was not satisfied. See
Brown v. Otis Elevator Co., 535 So.2d 525,
527 (La.Ct.App. 1988); Hester v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 392 So.2d 155, 156 (La.
Ct.App.1980); Bryan v. Otis Elevator Co.,
2 N.C.App. 593, 163 S.E.2d 534, 536-37
(1968); Norman v. Thomas Emery's Sons,
Inc., 7 Ohio App.2d 41, 36 0.0.2d 95, 218
N.E.2d 480, 482 (1966).
We find the reasoning of the New York,
Nevada, Florida and Pennsylvania courts to
be most persuasive. Accordingly, we are
satisfied that based on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Dover had exclusive
control of elevator number two.
| l']|vi(lcnce of complete control is not required. It may be established by evidence sufficient to warrant an inference
of its existence, and circumstantial evidence may suffice. The plaintiff is not
required in his proof to exclude remotely
possible causes and reduce the question
of control to a scientific certainty.
Leidrnfrost v. Atlantic Masonry, Inc., 235
Md. 244, 250, 201 A.2d 336 (1964). Although the Agreement purported to place
"possession or control" of the elevator with
CW, we hold that the contract's language
is not controlling. See Street, 327 So.2d at
114 ("Res ipsa loquitur is applicable where,
as here, the defendant manufactures, in-
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stalls, and maintains an automatic passenger elevator even though the mamtenance
contract purports to place control or possession in the building owner."). "The crucial point is the actual control of the elevator system
" Id. But see Bryan, 163
S.E.2d at 537 (contractual provision controls).
Dover manufactured, installed, and was
under a continuing contractual obligation
to maintain and repair elevator number
two. CW was obligated to prohibit others
from making repairs or adjustments to the
elevator. There was absolutely no evidence indicating that Prudential, CW, or
IBM attempted to repair the elevator. At
most, CW's building engineer would turn
the elevator off when IBM notified him of
a mechanical failure. "In sum, [CW and
Prudential] relied upon [Dover], as an expert in elevator maintenance, to locate and
remedy any defects, and in such capacity,
[the jury could have reasonably inferred
that Dover] had exclusive control of the
inspection and maintenance of [elevator
number two]." See Weeden, 468 N.Y.S.2d
at 904.
Furthermore, there was no evidence suggesting that the elevator was tampered
with, altered in any way, or subjected to
abuse. The elevator was used in an office
building, presumably in its intended manner. Cf. Harris, 92 Md.App. at 54, 606
A.2d 305; Parise, 136 N.E.2d at 116-17.
During a six week period preceding the
incident, Dover was notified four times of
misleveling problems with the elevator.
Repairs were made to the elevator, and
according to Moynihan, cleaning, rather
than replacing, the 14 and 15 contacts
caused the misleveling incident. "To require [Swann] to establish exclusive control
in [Dover] with respect to any possible
cause of the accident before permitting the
application of res ipsa loquitur would
emasculate the doctrine. He was required, as was done, only to produce sufficient evidence from which it could be said
that it was more likely than not that it was
negligence on the part of [Dover]." See
Briscoe, 572 P.2d at 537. The trial court
should have left the question of exclusive
control for the jury which could have rea-

sonably inferred from the evidence that
only Dover's negligence caused the accident.
(3)

[18] We now turn to the last element of
res ipsa loquitur: "under circumstances
indicating that the casualty did not result
from the act or omission of the plaintiff."
Appellees maintain that Swann's negligence contributed to the accident. We addressed this issue in Fields v. Morgan, 89
Md.App. 82, 382 A.2d 1099 (1978).
In Fields, the plaintiff brought suit
against the driver of a car in which he was
riding after he sustained personal injuries
when the car crashed into a tree.
During the trial [plaintiff], through the
testimony of a police officer, introduced
a statement made by [the driver] to the
effect that after striking the pedestrian
he wanted to stop but [plaintiff] insisted
he continue. According to the statement
the two men "drove off Powder Mill
Road until they got to a government
road and started fighting over the steer
ing wheel; went into a spin and they
struck a tree." The statement was contradicted by [plaintiff] who testified that
when [the driver] swerved and hit the
pedestrian, he struck his head on the
steering wheel and did not remember
another thing until he woke up in the
hospital some time later.
Id. at 84, 382 A.2d 1099. At the close of
plaintiff's case, the trial court ruled that
res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable and
granted the driver's motion for a directed
verdict. We held that the doctrine was
applicable and remanded the case for a new
trial.
There was direct evidence that [the driver and appellant] were fighting over the
steering wheel at the time of the accident
but there was also direct evidence that
[appellant] was unconscious and could
not have engaged in a fight. Under
these circumstances, the trial judge
should not have granted the motion for •
directed verdict as the resolution of the
conflicting testimony was for the jury.

Id. at 88, 382 A.2d 1099; see also Bams v.
Fonte, 241 Md. 123, 215 A.2d 739 (1966);
Powell v. Moore, 228 Or. 255, 364 P.2d
1094, 1100 (1961) (en banc) ("And even
where there is some evidence that plaintiff's failure to exercise care in the use of
defendant's equipment was a contributing
cause producing the injury, the doctrine is
not excluded as a matter of law; rather the
case is to be submitted to the jury with
proper instructions permitting the jury to
draw the inference of defendant's negligence if it finds that plaintiff by his own
conduct was not responsible for causing his
injury.")
In the case sub judice, Swann testified
that he looked into the elevator before entering, saw no exiting passengers, and entered without realizing the elevator had
misleveled. The elevator had misleveled by
twelve to eighteen inches, placing the distance between the floor and the roof of the
elevator at five feet, six inches to six feet.
Swann's human factors expert testified
that it was possible an individual would not
notice that an elevator misleveled under
these circumstances.
The trial court sent the issue of Appellees' negligence to the jury. The court also
instructed the jury on contributory negligence. Obviously, the court believed there
was a factual dispute as to both Appellees'
and Swann s negligence. Although we do
not know, it may very well be that the jury
found Swann was contributorily negligent.
Nevertheless, the jury could have reasonably found Swann proved all three elements of res ipsa loquitur by a preponderance of the evidence, and therefore, the
trial court erred in not instructing the jury
as requested. By refusing to give a res
ipsa loquitur instruction, the trial court
substituted its own judgment for that of
the jury. A new trial is ordered, but only
as to Dover.
The dissent is concerned with two aspects of the majority opinion. First, the
dissent points to the fact that Swann "marshalled evidence to show the precise cause
of the misleveling—the malfunction of the
contacts—and to show as well that Dover
was negligent in not replacing those con-

tacts prior to the accident." The dissent
concludes that "[w|hen the plaintiff's case
is so built around a specific, articulated
cause of the event and endeavors to show
that that cause arose solely because of
specific negligence on the defendant's
part," he should not be able to "avail himself of an inference that the event arose
from some other cause, also engendered by
the defendant's negligence" (emphasis in
original). The dissent is concerned that
this would allow a plaintiff to rely on res
ipsa loquitur in every negligence case.
1191 First, a plaintiff is entitled to a res
ipsa loquitur instruction only when Hicks
tripartite test is satisfied. Only a minority
of negligence cases call for such an instruction. Therefore, in that respect, the dissent's concern is unwarranted.
Second, by introducing specific evidence
that the failure to replace the contacts on
January 7th caused the misleveling, Swann
did not purport to furnish a complete explanation of the accident. There were other
unknowns. For example, Swann introduced evidence that Dover responded to
two separate reports of mislevelings subsequent to the January 7th repair. Not in
evidence was what, if any, corrective measures Dover took on those occasions. The
jury was free to accept or reject Swann's
expert testimony regarding the January
7th repair. If the jury believed that cleaning, rather than replacing, the contact was
proper, or that the alleged defective contact did not cause the misleveling, Swann
should not, as a matter of policy, be precluded from relying on an inference of neg
ligence.
[201 The dissent's "second concern is
with the notion that elevators don't mislev
el absent someone's negligence." The dis
sent suggests that "(mjechanical, electrical
and electronic devices fail or malfunctior
routinely [due to] [a] speck of dust, i
change in temperature, misuse, [or] an acci
dental unforeseen trauma." It may b<
true that mechanical, electrical, and elec
tronic devices fail due to non-negligen
causes. The dissent, however, confuse!
probabilism with absolutism.
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In Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon,
The first element of Hicks requires only
that the "casualty [was] of a sort which 619 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1980), the Supreme Court
usually does not occur in the absence of of Colorado considered whether an elevator
negligence." Hicks, 25 Md.App. at 516, door closing on a passenger was the kind
337 A.2d 744 (emphasis added).
of event which ordinarily does not occur in
[T]he majority of cases hold that a plain- the absence of negligence. The Court contiff to come within the res ipsa loquitur cluded it was, relying, in great part, on the
doctrine need not show such a state of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which profacts surrounding the accident as ex- vides:
cludes any reasonable hypothesis except
"The plaintiff need not, however, concludefendant's negligence. If the attendant
sively exclude all other possible explanafacts raise a reasonable inference of detions and so prove his case beyond a
fendant's negligence, they need not also
reasonable doubt
It is enough that
exclude every other inference. Plaintiff
the facts proved reasonably permit the
under this view is not required to exclude
conclusion that negligence is the more,
or negative all other possible causes of
probable explanation."
the accident except that of defendant's Id. at 69 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
negligence, but need only demonstrate a Torts, § 328D cmt. e (1964)); see also Kea"balance of probabilities" pointing to the ton, supra, § 39, at 248 ("The plaintiff is
defendant's negligence as a cause of the
not required to eliminate with certainty all
accident.
other possible causes or inferences, which
Speiser, supra, § 2:5, at 41-42 (footnotes
would mean that the plaintiff must prove a
omitted). Consequently, res ipsa loquitur
civil case beyond a reasonable doubt").
has been applied to a wide variety of
situations, and its range is as broad as For a misleveling case similar to the one
the possible events which reasonably jus- sub judice, with expert testimony similar
tify such a conclusion. It finds common to that presented in the court below, see
application, for example, in the case of Daniels v. Standard Oil Realty Corp., 145
objects such as bricks or window panes IIl.App.3d 363, 99 IIl.Dec. 284, 288, 495
falling from the defendant's premises, N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (1986), cert, denied,
falling elevators, the collapse of struc- where the Court held that "[i]n the normal
tures, live stock loose on the highway, course of events, an elevator does not operthe escape of gas or water from mains, ate as the elevator here did, and when it
or of electricity from wires or appliances, does, negligence is a more likely cause than
the explosion of boilers or other objects other causes."
under the defendant's control, or the esIn the case sub judice, the jury could
cape of dust or noxious gases from his have reasonably concluded that negligence
premises, the sudden starting of machin- was a more likely cause than other causes.
ery, the detachment of wheels from mov- This is all the first element of the Hicks
ing vehicles, injuries to passengers from test requires. The ultimate determination
causes within the control of the carrier, of negligence is for the jury. Therefore,
such as derailment, the sudden stop of a since this is, at worst, a borderline case, the
bus, or its defective equipment, some jury, and not the court, should decide. See
kinds of automobile accidents, such as a Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, 146 Ariz. 98, 703
car suddenly leaving the highway and
P.2d 1247, 1250 (Ct.App.1985) (whether an
going into a ditch or colliding with a
elevator malfunction would ordinarily not
stationary object, or starting down hill
not long after it has been parked at the occur absent someone's negligence is a jury
curb, defective food in sealed containers, question in borderline cases).
and many other similar occurrences.
(B)
W. Page Keaton et al., Prosser and KeaMissing Evidence
ton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 244-45
(5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added) (footnotes
[21] Swann argues that the trial court
omitted).
erred in refusing to instruct the jury n-
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garding alleged missing evidence. According to Swann, Dover failed to produce all of
the repair order tickets from the repair
calls made between December 1986 and the
date of the incident. He claims the failure
to retain these documents was in direct
conflict with Dover's document retention
policy.
Swann did not preserve the issue for our
review. Thus, we do not reach the merits
of his argument. Although Swann submitted a proposed jury instruction regarding
missing evidence, Swann did not object to
the trial court's failure to give the instruction to the jury. "No party may assign as
error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless the party objects on the
record promptly after the court instructs
the jury, stating distinctly the matter to
which the party objects and the grounds of
the objection." Rule 2-520(e); Barone v.
Winebrenner, 189 Md. 142, 145, 55 A.2d
505 (1947) ("The purpose, of course, in requiring exceptions to be made to the instructions of the trial judge before the jury
retires is to give that judge an opportunity
to correct or add to his instructions matters
either first erroneously stated or omitted.").
(C)
Violation of a Statute as Evidence
of Negligence
[22] Swann argues the trial court erred
by refusing to instruct the jury that the
violation of a statute is evidence of negligence. Swann cites Maryland Annotated
Code article 83B, § 6-102 (1991), and asserts that it "authorizes the Maryland Department of Housing and Community fsic]
to develop and promulgate appropriate
building codes to protect the public when it
uses buildings in this State." Swann continues by pointing out that "the Department adopted, and incorporated by reference, the ANSI A117.1 Building Code"
which provides:
Elevator operation shall be automatic.
Each car shall be equipped with a selfleveling feature that will automatically
bring the car to floor landings within a
tolerance of xk in (13 mm) under rated
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loading to zero loading conditions. Thi
self-leveling feature shall be automati
and independent of the operating devic
and shall correct for overtravel or undei
travel.
American National Standard Institute, Inc
American National Standard for Builo
ings and Facilities—Providing Accessibii
ity and Usability for Physically Hand\
capped People § 4.10.2 (1986) (hereinafte
"ANSI A117.1"); see also COMAR 05.02
02.02(H). Swann contends that since Mo>
nihan testified that the above provision a^
plies in Maryland, and since he is "withi
the class of people governed [sic] by thes
provisions," the court erred in failing t
instruct the jury as requested. We di?
agree.
"It is well settled in Maryland that
violation of a building code can be evidenc
of breach of a duty owed." Gardenvillag
Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md.App. 25, 3(
366 A.2d 101 (1976). It is equally settlec
however, that "[t|he violation of a [code
may furnish evidence of negligence ..
only where the person alleging negligenc
is within the class of persons sought to b
protected, and the harm suffered is of th
kind which the [code] was intended, in ger
eral, to prevent." Atlantic Mut. Ins. Ct
v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 124, 591 A.2d 50
(1991) (citation omitted). Further, the vi<
lation of a code must be a proximate caus
of the harm. Id. at 127, 591 A.2d 50'
Article 83B, § 6-102(a)(1) of the Annota
ed ('ode of Maryland provides: "The I)<
partment . .. shall promulgate and adopt
State building code for the purpose of di
veloping rules and regulations for makin
buildings and facilities accessible and u
able by the physically handicapped
(emphasis added). In response to § f
102(a)(l)'s directive, the Department <
Housing and Community Development pr
mulgated the "Maryland Building Code f<
the Handicapped." COMAR 05.02.02. Tl
purpose of the code "is to establish mir
mum requirements that will provide a re
sonable degree of accessibility and usabi
ty of buildings and facilities by the phyf
cnlly handicapped"
COMAR 05.02.0:
02(A) (emphasis added). Specifically,
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[t]he specifications . . . are intended to
make buildings and facilities accessible
to and usable by people with such physical disabilities as the inability to walk,
difficulty walking, reliance on walking
aids, blindness and visual impairment,
deafness and hearing impairment, incoordination, reaching and manipulation disabilities, lack of stamina, difficulty interpreting and reacting to sensory information, and extremes of physical size. Accessibility and usability allow a physically handicapped person to get to, enter, and use a building or facility.

Appellees contend that the trial court's
instructions fairly instructed the jury as to
a land owner's duty. Therefore, it was not
necessary for the trial court to give
Swann's requested instructions.
During the jury instruction phase of trial, the court instructed the jury as follows:
The plaintiff in this case, Mr. Swann, is
what the contemplation of law [sic] is
called the invitee. An invitee is a person
who is on the property of another for the
interest of the owner or occupier of the
premises.
The owner or occupier of premises has
ANSI A117.1, § 1.1 (emphasis added).
a duty to the invitee. The owner/occupier must use ordinary care to see that
It is crystal clear that COMAR 05.02.those portions of the property which the
02.02 and ANSI A117.1 are not intended to
invitee, in this case Mr. Swann reasonprotect "the public." Rather, the intent of
ably may be expected to use are safe or
these provisions is to make public buildings
if not safe to give the invitee reasonable
accessible and usable by physically handinotice of the unsafe condition.
capped persons. For example, § 4.10.2 alIf the owner/occupier of the premises
lows individuals confined to a wheelchair
sets aside a portion of the property for
ready access to elevators by requiring the
the common use of his tenants owes [sic]
elevator to have a self-leveling feature that
the tenants a duty to exercise ordinary
brings the elevator to within Vt inch of
care to keep those portions of the premisfloor level. As Appellees point out, there
es in a safe condition or if not safe to
was no evidence that Swann was physically
notify the tenants of the unsafe condidisabled at the time of the accident. Action.
cordingly, Swann may have incidentally
Also further the landlord or occupier
benefited from the code provision, but he
who has agreed to make repairs may be
was not "within the class of persons
responsible for the injuries resulting
sought to be protected." Kenney, 323 Md.
from his failure to make such repairs.
at 124, 591 A.2d 507.
Swann claims the trial court improperly
refused to read to the jury the following
(D)
two proposed instructions:
Non-Delegability of a Land Owner's Duty
The duty of a land owner to a business
invitee is a non-delegable duty. That is
[231 Last, Swann argues that the trial
something of a misnomer, as the owner
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury
is free to delegate the duty of perforthat the duty a land owner owes to a busimance to another, but the owner cannot
ness invitee is non-delegable. Swann notes
thereby avoid or delay its liability for the
that CW and Prudential's defense focused
non-performance of the delegated duties.
on their lack of notice—that Dover did not
Where an owner invites a business invinotify them of any problems and that they
tee to come onto its premises, the duty of
relied upon the expertise of Dover for all
the owner to the invitee is not changed
decisions concerning the care and mainteby the employment of an independent
nance of the elevator. According to
contractor.
Swann, Prudential, as a property owner,
had a nondelegable duty to correct all unA land owner has a duty to keep its
reasonable risks, or to warn invitees of
property in a safe condition which it
them, if they knew or should have known
holds open to the public. That duty can
of such risks.
not be delegated. The land owner is

responsible for the condition of the property. The land owner is not responsible
merely to supervise the independent contractor that it has hired to maintain the
property. Although the property owner
may hire someone to perform maintenance on the premises, the land owner
cannot avoid or delegate the risk of nonperformance of the duty by the person so
hired.
We perceive no error.
A party is generally entitled to have its
theory of the case presented to the jury if:
"(1) the instruction . . . correctly state[s]
the law, and (2) that law [is] applicable in
light of the evidence before the jury."
Pickett, 285 Md. at 194, 401 A.2d 651. This
notwithstanding, however, "[t]here is no
obligation that the trial court point out any
and all of the reciprocal duties and obligations of the respective parties in minute
detail, provided the subject is fully and
comprehensively covered in the charge to
the jury." Flohr v. Coleman, 245 Md. 254,
266, 225 A.2d 868 (1967).
We hold that the instructions given fairly
and comprehensively instructed the jury as
to the duty a land owner owes an invitee.
Swann's requested instructions would have
overemphasized Prudential and CW's duty,
and would have been unduly suggestive
and prejudicial. The trial court did not
state that a land owner's duty was delegable; therefore, the jury should not have
been under the impression that the duty
was delegable.

I have two concerns with the panel majority's conclusions regarding a res ipsa
loquitur instruction. First, although I
quite agree that, under current Maryland
law, the mere offering of evidence of specific negligence does not, of itself, preclude
a jury, upon a proper res ipsa loquitur
instruction, from inferring negligent conduct, it seems to me that the plaintiff really
did prove (or attempt to prove) too much
for the doctrine to apply in this case. He
marshalled evidence to show the precise
cause of the misleveling—the malfunction
of the contacts—and to show as well that
Dover was negligent in not replacing those
contacts prior to the accident. The focus
of the case was on whether Dover was
remiss in merely cleaning the contacts rather than replacing them.
When the plaintiff's case is so built
around a specific, articulated cause of the
event and endeavors to show that thai
cause arose solely because of specific negli
gence on the defendant's part, I do nol
believe that the plaintiff, if he fails to per
suade the jury that his position has merit
can then avail himself of an inference thai
the event arose from some other cause
also engendered by the defendant's negli
gence. If that were the case, a res ipsr
loquitur instruction would be appropriate
in every negligence case. If that is wha
Mr. Speiser is selling (Maj. op. p. 1005),
don't buy it.

My second concern is with the notioi
that elevators don't mislevel absent some
one's negligence. This Court made a simi
lar kind of bald statement, with respect t<
escalators, in Beach v. Woodward & Loth
rop, Inc., 18 Md.App. 645, at 649, 308 A.2
439 (1973), offering no authority or rations
explanation for the statement. Similar pre
nouncements have been made by othc
courts, as mentioned by the panel majority
and so I obviously cannot complain that il
WILNER, Chief Judge, concurring and
conclusion in this regard is without an
dissenting.
legal support. My problem is in unde
I concur in the affirmance of the judg- standing the rationale for such a doctrin
ments in favor of Prudential and Carey Mechanical, electrical, and electronic d
Winston but dissent from the reversal of vices fail or malfunction routinely—son
more routinely than others. A speck <
the judgment in favor of Dover.

JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF APPEI^
LEES PRUDENTIAL AND CAREY WINSTON AFFIRMED; JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE DOVER REVERSED; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID % BY APPEI/LANT AND Vb BY APPELLEE DOVER.
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dust, a change in temperature, misuse, an
accidental
unforeseen
trauma—many
things can cause these devices to malfunction. To allow an inference that the malfunction is due to someone's negligence
when the precise cause cannot be satisfactorily established appears to me to be unwarranted. The cases cited by the panel

yir,iji r» i.rtnR
majority say it is so, but they don't say
why it is so—at least not convincingly.

IN. n.

1017

Cite «t 620 A.2d 1017 ( N i l . 1993)

WELTS' CASE.
No. LD-90-007.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
Feb. 12, 1993.
In attorney discipline proceeding, the
Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that: (1)
even if representation of client in related
matters is of highest quality, misrepresenting to client that suit has been filed when
in fact it has not violates Rules of Professional Conduct requiring lawyer to provide
competent representation to client, to act
with reasonable promptness and diligence
in representing client, and prohibiting conduct involving misrepresentation, and (2)
such misconduct warrants public censure.
Ordered accordingly.
1. Attorney and Client <3=>44(1)
Even if representation of client in related matters is of highest quality, misrepresenting to client that suit has been filed
when in fact it has not violates Rules of
Professional Conduct requiring lawyer to
provide competent representation to client,
to act with reasonable promptness and diligence in representing client, and prohibiting conduct involving misrepresentation.
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1(a), (b)(5),
(c)(4) 1.3(a), 8.4(c).
2. Attorney and Client e=*38
Finding of misrepresentation alone
constitutes "misconduct" for purposes of
Rule of Professional Conduct prohibiting
lawyers from engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"; rule is disjunctive. Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4(c).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Attorney and Client 0=58
To accomplish desired ends of attorney
discipline proceedings, including protection
of public, maintenance of public confidence
in bar, preservation of legal profession's
integrity, and prevention of similar con-

duct, hut not punishment, every case is
judged on its own facts and circumstances,
4. Attorney and Client <s=s58
Attorney misconduct in misrepresent
ing to client that suit has been filed, when
in fact it has not, mitigated by isolated
nature of misconduct, attorney's candor
and cooperation with Committee on Professional Conduct, voluntary disclosure of misconduct in manner calculated to mitigate
prejudice to client, lack of prior disciplinary
record, lack of personal gain as motive,
personal and emotional problems, and remorse warrants only public censure, not
six-month suspension. Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1(a). (b)(5), (c)(4), 1.3(a), 1.4(a),
8.4(c).
Carroll R. Hunter, PA., Meredith (Carroll R. Hunter on brief and orally and Peter
J. Minkow on the brief), for committee on
professional conduct.
Aeschliman & Tober, P.A., Portsmouth
(Stephen L. Tober on the brief and orally),
for respondent.
HORTON, Justice.
This action is brought by the committee
on professional conduct (the committee),
which petitions this court to suspend the
respondent, Jeremy Welts, from the practice of law in this State for a period of six
months. On October 24, 1990, we appointed a Judicial Referee (Bean, J.) to conduct
a hearing on the committee's petition. The
referee found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent violated Rules
1.1(a), 1.1(b)(5), 1.1(c)(4), 1.3(a), 1.4(a), and
8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(the Rules). The respondent maintains that
the evidence presented does not support
the findings of ethical misconduct. Failing
this argument, he contends that mitigating
circumstances favor the imposition of a
reprimand rather than a suspension.
Early in 1987, Robert and Mary Dam
bach consulted with the respondent's lav*
firm regarding financial problems theii
small corporation was having with its prin
cipal lender, New Hampshire Business De
velopment Corporation (NHBI)C). In Jul)
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then you realized the door was closing?
A

It wasn't closing slow.

Q

But you realized the door was closing at

that point in time?
A

Yeah.

Q

And then what did jyou do?

A

When it closed, the only thing I felt

was my wrist slam against the thing.

I just stuck

my body in there to push and get my arm out, and
that's when I started -MR. NIELSEN:

You pushed your body

against the outside of the elevator?
THE WITNESS:

To push it open.

MR. NIELSEN:

You have to give him

—

describe that.
THE WITNESS:
Q

See, right here.

(By Mr. Fowler)

You're referring to

Exhibit 1 again?
A

See, when this thing was closing.

Q

You mean the

A

On my wrist, it slammed my wrist there

in between.
to push.

—

I had to stick my body in between there

I got my wrist out of there, okay, and

then I said a lot of curse words, going crazy.
Q

Let me back up again.

What I want to
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1

know, when the door began to close or when you

2

became aware that it was closing, you were still

3 J outside, your body was still outside the elevator;
4 J is that correct?
5 I

A

Yeah, my body was outside.

6

Q

Were your arms reaching into the el --

7 I

A

Yes, they was.

8 I

Q

How long was this mop you had in your

10

A

The same size as a mop.

11 J

Q

Just a standard mop?

12

A

Yeah.

13

Q

Was it not as tall as you are?

14

A

I imagine, you know, the mop.

9 I hands?

15
16

Five feet, six feet, four

THE WITNESS:

I can't really say.

feet?

17
18

MR. NIELSEN:

wasn't a small mop.

It

It was probably about the same

19 J height as me.
20

Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

Okay, roughly?

21

A

Yeah.

22

Q

And you were able to, by standing

23

outside the elevator and reaching in with the mop

24

handle in your arms, you were able to reach enough

25

of the

—
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1

A

Yeah.

2

Q

Could you have done the whole surface of

3

the floor from there without stepping into the

4

elevator?

5

A

Yeah, no problem.

6

Q

Okay, what position was your body in

7

when the door began to close on you?

8

A

Straight.

9

Q

You were standing up straight?

10

A

Yeah.

When I was going like this.

11

That's when I went like that.

12

hit my wrist.

13 J
14

Q

That's when the door

You're indicating that you were leaning

forward?

15

A

Yeah, leaning forward.

16

Q

Did you have your arms extended forward

17

ahead of you?

18

A

Yes.

Sometimes I use one mop to, one

19 J hand to mop.
20

Q

Were you using one hand at the time?

21

A

I think so.

22

Q

So you think the mop was in your left

24

A

It was in my left hand.

25

Q

What was your right hand doing?

23

hand?
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A

My right hand?

Q

Yes.

A

Sometimes I mop like that, you know,

Q

I'm just asking you if you remember how

your body was positioned.

You indicated that --

A

I was leaning forward.

Q

You were leaning forward, but at first

you showed me both your arms extended out in front
of you, and now you're saying the mop may have been
in one hand, so I'm trying to clarify.
A

When people mop, they can mop two ways,

with both hands on the mop or one hand on the mop.
Q

Right.

And what were you doing is the

question?
A

I was just mopping.

Q

With one hand or two hands?

A

First with both hands, and then I let

this one go (indicating).
MR. NIELSEN:

The right one go?

THE WITNESS:

The right one go, and then

I started mopping with my left.
Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

So your right hand was

down with your left?
A

Yes.

Q

And your right hand was extended out
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holding the mop trying to get the floor mopped?
A

I only got halfway until the incident

happened.
Q

When the door closed, what specifically

did you do with your body?

Did you try to stand up

straight?
A

When it caught me there, it slammed my

wrist against that -- in between here.
MR. NIELSEN:

In between the door and

THE WITNESS:

Yeah.

the wall?

Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

What I'm asking you,

did you try to stand up straight and pull your arm
back before the door closed?
A

I wasn't really all way down like this.

I was -Q

You were standing up, but slightly

hunched forward?
A

Not that hunched.

Q

Just a little bit?

A

But

Q

But you had your arm out?

A

Yeah.

Q

Did you try to pull your arm back before

—

the door closed on it?
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1

A

No.

2

Q

Were you trying to hold the door open

3

with your arm?

4

A

5

I was trying to see to get it open, but

it just took my arm, slammed it against the thing,

6

Q

So are you saying that when you began to

7

realize the door was closing, you pressed against it

8

with your left arm to try to keep it open?

9

MR. NIELSEN:

Go ahead.

10

THE WITNESS:

I'm saying when I was

11

mopping, okay, the door slammed my hand against the

12

wall.

13

Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

You've said that, I'm

14

asking you what happened before it, you hit the

15

wall, did you try to pull your arm back or press it

16

against the door?

17

A

I took my body to press it open.

18

Q

That didn't happen before the -- let me

19

finish my question —

20

with the wall?

21

A

before the door made contact

I didn't push my arm.

22

MR. NIELSEN:

Let me ask him a

23

question.

When you realized the door was closing,

24

did you try to hold the door to keep it from closing

25

with your left arm?
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THE WITNESS:

Yeah.

MR. NIELSEN:

Tell him about that.

You're having a hard time answering the question.
You tried to hold the door open?
THE WITNESS:

I tried to hold the door

from closing my arm.
Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

Tell me what exactly

you did with your arm?
A

What any person would do.

Q

Which is what?
MR. NIELSEN:

Tell him how you did it.

THE WITNESS:

Just went like this

(indicating).
Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

You're indicating with

your right arm, but you actually were using your
left arm at the time?
A

No, my right arm.
MR. NIELSEN:

He's not talking about

trying to pull out after the door was closed.

He's

talking about before it was closed.
Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

collect your thoughts.

Take a minute and

I want you to have a moment

and think about that so you can give me your best
recollection.
A

I know when I stuck my arm out for it to
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close on my wrist, okay, it did not, you know, go
open necessarily.
Q

The door didn't open when you touched

A

Yeah, it just kept on going,

Q

Which arm were you using to try to keep

it?

the door from closing?
A

This one right here (indicating),

Q

Your right arm, and were you pushing on

the sides of the door with the palm of your hand?
A

No, this is the one that I had the mop

Q

Right, you had the mop in your left

in.

hand, so as you realized the door was closing, you
reached with your right hand?
A

Yeah.

Q

And with the palm of your hands pressed

against the edge of the door; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

What part of the door did you press your

palm of your hand against?
A

What part of the door?

Q

Right.
MR. NIELSEN:

How high up on the door?

THE WITNESS:

I can't -130
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MR. NIELSEN:

Go ahead and demonstrate

so he can see physically how it happened.
THE WITNESS:

It was like right here

(indicating).
MR. NIELSEN:

The record will reflect

that the witness is holding his right-hand against
an imaginary closing door which is a chalkboard, I
guess, or an easel of some sort on the wall, and
it's being held at about his breast level, the shirt
pocket level.

Is that fair, counsel?

MR. FOWLER:
Q

That's fine.

(By Mr. Fowler)

Is it your memory that

you stood up or stood any more erect before you
reached out and put your palm of your hand on the
door, or did you remain essentially in the same
position while you did that?
A

Shoot, when something like that hits

you, I was up.
Q

Okay.

A

So you know even if I pushed from here

to here (indicating), I would have enough strength
to get my body into there.
MR. NIELSEN:

To get your body into the

position of pushing against the door?
THE WITNESS:

See, if I was down like
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this, it would be hard.

I would have had my arm

ripped off.
MR. NIELSEN:

Do you remember your

posture when you pushed against the door?
THE WITNESS:
Q

Yeah, I was up.

(By Mr. Fowler)

Again, I know we are

going over this several times, so the details get
clearer each time we do it.

As the door began to

close or you became aware that it was closing, you
stood up and reached forward with your right hand
and pressed against it in thinking that it would -A

It would pop open, but it didn't, it

kept on going, so that's when I stuck my body in
between the wall and -Q

Now, what I'm asking you, you indicated

that the height at which you think you've placed
your hands against the sides of the door that was
closing, I want to ask you too whether there's a
single door that closes or two doors or were you
aware of, anything of that nature?

Are we talking

about a single door or double door?
A

The door goes like this, one way.

Q

Okay, I realize it's one door that

closes, but are there two doors that open and go
together were over here and over here, and when it
132
SUSAN K. HELLBERG, R.P.R.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

Tif-

<~

r~ .

A

I'm not sure what I mean to say.

some elevators, there's a door.

On

I can't really say,

it looked like just a single door, you know, because
there's an elevator right here, and an elevator
right there.

The way it closed, it closed -- this

one closed this way, and other one closed this way,
and the one that I got hurt from my left, it closed
to my right.
Q

Okay, what I'm asking is was there a

door inside the other door, and I'm talking about
the one service freight elevator where you were
hurt, on some elevators, there's a door that will
open to the hallway?
A

See, I can't really say.

I'm not, you

Q

You didn't observe that one way or the

A

No.

Q

Do you know whether you placed your

know.

other?

right hand on the side door?

Did you have your

hands all the way around it, so that your fingers
were on the inside?
A

My hand was like this (indicating).

Q

You sort of had a grasp around the
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1

inside of the door?

2

A

Yes.

3

MR. NIELSEN:

The witness indicates when

4

your hand was like this, your fingers are extended

5

and your thumb is on the outside surface of this

6 J assembly of doors, and the edge of your ring finger
7 1 is on the other edge?
8

THE WITNESS:

It was just around it like

MR. NIELSEN:

Your hand was trying to

9 J you could.
10

11 J surround the door assembly?
12

THE WITNESS:

13

Q

Yeah.

(By Mr. Fowler)

Did you observe on the

14

door a flexible plastic or rubber edge that you

15

could impact that would cause the door to open up

16

again?

17
18

A little rubber leading

THE WITNESS:

I think so.

edge?

19
20
21

MR. NIELSEN:

Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

with that when you tried to

Did you make contact
—

22

A

Well, I had my arm around it.

23

Q

Your hand was around that as well as the

A

I can't tell you that it was.

24
25

door?
There's
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two doors because I'm not the one that makes the
elevators.
Q

Maybe there was only one.

I'm asking if

you saw one way or another?
MR- NIELSEN:

On all elevators, there's

an inside door and an outside door.
Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

My question is, do you

recall that your action of putting your hand against
the inside of the door caused that runner or plastic
leading edge to be depressed against the door?
MR. NIELSEN:

Do you remember whether

your hand made contact with that?
THE WITNESS:

It made contact with it,

but, see, the problem is if it made contact, then
why did the door deep on going.
Q

(By Mr. Fowler)

When you say it made

contact with it, are you talking the door or that
pressure edge?
A

I , m saying when the door was closing.

Q

Right.

A

You know, it's like, you know, when you

got your hands around that, doesn't it push in?
Q

And your memory is that you put your

hands around it and pushed it in?
A

Yeah.
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